PANEL I: DIRECT/GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE INTERNET by unknown
NYLS Journal of Human Rights 
Volume 15 
Issue 1 SHOULD CYBERSPACE BE A FREE 
SPEECH ZONE?: FILTERS, "FAMILY 
FRIENDLINESS," AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Article 4 
1998 
PANEL I: DIRECT/GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE INTERNET 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(1998) "PANEL I: DIRECT/GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE INTERNET," NYLS Journal of Human 
Rights: Vol. 15 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights/vol15/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in NYLS Journal of Human Rights by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
© Copyight 1998 by the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights
VOLUME XV SYMPOSIUM 1998 PART ONE
Should Cyberspace Be A Free Speech Zone?: Filters,
"Family Friendliness," And The First Amendment
Panel I: Direct/Government Regulation Of The
Internet
Prof Nadine Strossen
MS. STROSSEN: I would like to welcome everybody. My name is
Nadine Strossen. I have the pleasure of being the faculty advisor for the
Journal of Human Rights symposium this year and also the moderator of
this event.
I have great pride in bringing to you a distinguished group of
outstanding panelists, and in order not to detract from the already limited
time they have available to share their insights with you, I am not going to
give them any introductions. When you came in, you picked up the
programs that have the very impressive biographies of all of our speakers.
Also, I would like to refer you to programs for the acknowledgments of
the many individuals both on the Journal of Human Rights and elsewhere
at New York Law School for their many contributions to today's event. I
would like to take the time now to single out only two individuals who did
the lion's share of the work -- although, since they are both women, I
should say "lionesses"' share of the work-- in organizing the conference.
They are Julianne Siano, Executive Topics Editor of the Journal, who is
here, and my Assistant Lara Meinke, who is not here since she is busy
assisting me up in her office. Also, I would like to thank one individual
who was not mentioned in the program but who will be very much visible
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here and that is Bob Ward, the Manager of Audiovisual Services for New
York Law School, who is videotaping these proceedings.
Just a couple of words about our format. First, I am going to
strictly enforce time limits, as I have warned our speakers. I have a
stopwatch with me and as I said to them, at the 15-minute point, I will cut
them off even if they are in the middle of a sentence and even if the
sentence is a brilliant and eloquent one.
The other point I would like to make is that I will be calling on
speakers in reverse alphabetical order. The serendipity of the alphabet was
such if I had done this in the normal alphabetical order, the fist speaker
would have been from the American Civil Liberties Union and the
government lawyers would have been relegated to the end of the panel.
I don't want to create even the appearance of favoritism here, where I am
not serving in my ACLU capacity. Accordingly, we will here from our
panelists in reverse alphabetical order making our first speaker, the first
speaker the Honorable Jeanine Ferris Pirro. Before I call on her, I will
break my rule and add two points to her introduction. One is that beyond
the very impressive facts that are set out in her biography - Jeanine, I am
surprised you don't have this in your official bio; I would be so proud if
it happened to me - Ms. Pirro was included in People Magazine last May
as one of the 50 most beautiful people, not only in Westchester County,
but, indeed, in the world!
MS. PIRRO: I can't believe, you of all people.
MS. STROSSEN: I consider appearance, including clothing, important
and that's why we, at the ACLU oppose school uniforms,' which violate
the right to dress the way you want, so we expect you to help us on that,
Jeanine! In any event we are honored to have Ms. Pirro's beautiful
presence here. But also another compliment -- Jeanine, I think you should
add this to your bio as well she wrote a letter that was cited by United
'See Amy Mitchell Wilson, Note, Public School Dress Codes: The Constitutional
Debate, 1998 BYU EDUc. & LI 147, 167 (1998) (discussing the First Amendment protection
of speech and expression in reference to school dress codes); see also Loren Siegel, Point of
View: School Uniforms (last modified Mar. 1, 1996) <http://www.aclu.org/congress/
uniform.html>.
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States District Judge Loretta Preska in the Southern District of New York
in ALA v. Pataki,2 the case in which the ACLU and the New York Civil
Liberties Union successfully challenged New York's version of the
Communications Decency Act,3 and I thought it was wonderful that
Jeanine's letter was cited by the judge in support of her conclusion that
this statute was unconstitutional.4 It was ironic because the State of New
York had listed Jeanine as one of its own expert witnesses. To all of your
other well-deserved accolades, we thank you for helping us strike down
that law as unconstitutional! If you want to reply, I will not subtract it
from your time.
Hon. Jeanine Ferris Pirro
MS. PIRRO:5 Let me say thank you for those compliments. I am delighted
to be here this morning and I would like to, as the first speaker, start out
on what I believe is a noncontroversial note, one on which all of us agree,
that pedophiles are a danger to our children. This is true regardless of how
the pedophile engages the child, even if the relationship starts out via the
Internet. Another basic agreement that we all have here is that the Internet
presents an immensely valuable means of communication for our children
as well as for adults. But that being said, there are limits to free
2 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
3 See id at 184 (holding New York Penal Law § 235.21(3), which criminalized the
use of a computer to disseminate obscene material to minors, unconstitutional as it violated the
Commerce Clause).
4 See American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(referring to the letter Jeanine Pirro wrote to Governor Pataki on February 13, 1996, which
reflects potential expectations of applying the N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(3) to interstate
commerce).
5 Hon. Jeanine Ferris Pirro is the District Attorney of Westchester County, New
York. In 1990, Ms. Pirro became the first woman in the history of the county to be elected to
the Westchester County Court. She has served in both family and criminal courts.
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expression. Child pornography is not protected speech,
6 it is child abuse,7
and as a society we have set that standard.8 We have said that one cannot
promote child pornography in a face-to-face meeting, nor do so via the
telephone or in magazines. 9
The question we confront, how do we translate the limits on
speech to the Internet? And of course, what we have seen in the past few
months is that both Congress and the New York State legislature have
been unable to pass statutes that pass constitutional muster.'° The fact is
that the courts have ruled the statutes unconstitutional,"1 either because
they are overbroad12 or vague 13 or in New York because they violate the
Commerce Clause. 14 Now, we have to decide where we go from here and
6 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982) (explaining that "virtually all
of the States and the United States have passed legislation proscribing the production of or
otherwise combating of 'child pornography"').
7 See id. at 759 (stating that child pornography relates to child abuse with respect
to the harm that widespread circulation of pornographic materials can cause); see generally
Adam J. Wasserman, Note, Virtual.Child.Porn.Com: Defending the Constitutionality of the
Criminalization of Computer-Generated Child Pornography by the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 -- A Reply to Professor Burke and Other Critics, 35 HARv. J. ONLEGIS.
245,259 (1998) (defending the constitutionality of the Child Pornography Prevention Act which
criminalizes computer-generated pornography that involves an identifiable minor).
8 See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act).
9 See United States v. Schultz, 970 F.2d 960, 964 (1st Cir. 1992) (discussing a
defendant who was convicted for distributing child pornography during a personal meeting);
United States v. Lamb, 945 F.Supp. 441,451-52 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (referring to the criminal
nature of dissemination of child pornography via e-mail and telephone).
10 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 160.
11 See id. at 183 (explaining the N.Y. PENAL CODE § 235.21(3), which was
designed to protect children from pedophiles, falls afoul of the Commerce Clause barring the
state from enforcing the obscenity statute).
12 See, e.g., Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2329 (invalidating provisions of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) designed to protect minors from harmful material on the
Internet because it suppressed an unnecessarily broad range of adult speech).
13 James M. McGee, Burning The Village to Roast the Pig: Congressional
Attempt to Regulate "Indecency" on the Internet Rejected on ACLU v. Reno, 4 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 437 (1997) (stating that the Communications Decency Act is too "broad, vague, and
not narrowly tailored").
14 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 167 (stating the New York Act falls within the
interests protected by the Commerce Clause).
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how we can draft legislation that protects our children and still ensures
protections for appropriate expression. As a prosecutor, my concern is
practical, not theoretical. I deal every day with children who are molested,
some of them are molested via the Internet. It is my belief that the laws as
they exist in New York do not adequately cover situations of abuse on the
Internet.
While the Internet is new, protecting our children from potentially
damaging materials and communication is not new. Throughout history,
we have tried to keep up with our changing society to cover those kinds
of activities that criminals are engaging in. This is especially important as
we reach a new area of technological advances. Pedophiles should not be
able to communicate indecent material to minors.' 5 It should be no
different when the pedophile lurks behind a computer terminal. I would
argue that because the computer allows the sender a certain amount of
anonymity, the criminal penalties should be enhanced.
Pedophiles knowingly take advantage of anonymity by misleading
their Victims.' 6 In a Westchester case 17 -- which was one of the reasons
that the New York State legislature passed legislation 8 -- the defendant,
a 51 year old man, told his 13-year-old victim that he was 14.19 In the
course of their Internet communications, he told her that he was in
school.20 They developed a relationship. 21 After about four or six months,
15 Keith F. Durkin, Misuse of the Internet by Pedophiles: Implications for Law
Enforcement and Probation Practice, 61 FED. PROBATION 14-15 (1997) (stating how
pedophiles can now transmit pornographic pictures through computer networks).
16 John T. Soma, et al, Transnational Extradition For Computer Crimes: Are
New Treaties and Laws Needed?, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 317, 337 (1997) (stating how the
pedophile's anonymity often leads to the child's harm).
17 Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 170 (describing a Westchester case where an adult male
communicated sexually explicit materials by computer to a thirteen year old girl over a period
of several months).
18 Id. (describing how the case prompted a New York statute making it a crime to
transmit indecent material to minors).
19 Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 170.
20 id.
21 See generally id.; see also John Heileman, The Crusader, NEW YORKER, Mar.
3, 1997, at 122 (explaining how Alan Paul Barlow had been "swapping e-mail with a 14 year
old ... girl that he met on America Online").
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the communications became sexually explicit.22 He would talk about his
penis and her vagina. He told her how he was tingling and how his "Love
Bunny" -- a nickname for his penis -- wants to meet her vagina.23 Finally,
after gaining her trust, he indicated to her that he was not 14 years old but
was an adult and that he wanted to come to New York to meet her. He
comes to New York and meets with the girl. Fortunately, the mother of
the 13-year-old sees them together and calls the police. He is arrested in
New York for the misdemeanor of endangering the welfare of a child, the
only charge that applied. In New York a person is guilty of endangering
the welfare of a child when he knowingly acts in a manner that is likely to
be injurious to the physical, moral or mental welfare of someone under the
age of 17.24
We felt that this charge did not reflect the severity of this
particular crime because it was only a misdemeanor. 25 We proposed
legislation that we thought would survive constitutional muster.26 It was
consistent with judicial definitions of "harmful to minors," 27 definitions of
"obscenity" 28 and "obscene material." 29 New York has a rich history of
22 Michael Meyer, Stop! Cyberthief, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1995, at 36 (indicating
that over time, Barlow's communications became "more and more intimate"); see also Jon
Jefferson, Deleting Cybercrooks, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 69 (reporting that Barlow "soon began
making sexual overtures"); Heileman, supra note 21, at 122 (explaining that Barlow's e-mail
was "transparently" sexual in nature).
23 See Heileman, supra note 21, at 122 (quoting the Barlow e-mail messages that
euphemistically referred to their genitalia).24 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(1) (McKinney 1997).
25 Jefferson, supra note 22, at 69 (quoting Pirro saying that the existing New York
laws were inadequate to punish Barlow's crime); see also Heileman, supra note 21, at 122
(reporting that Pirro's anger at the law's inadequacy in the Barlow case prompted her to propose
amending the penal code).
26 See Thomas Goetz, Gag Rules: A State Law Targets Pedophiles and Speech
in Cyberspace, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 12, 1996, at 19 (quoting State Senator Sears defending
the law on Constitutional grounds); see also Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 183 (citing the State's
argument that "the law was designed to avoid the Constitutional pitfalls" of the Communications
Decency Act).
27 See N.Y PENAL LAW § 235.20(6) (McKinney 1997) (defining "harmful to
minors"); Ginsberg v. New York, 391 U.S. 971 (1968) (upholding the constitutionality of the
"harmful to minors" definition).
28 Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00(1) (McKinney 1997), with N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 235.20(6) (McKinney 1997) (utilizing extremely similar definitions of"obscene"); see
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defining these terms. The New York statute was enacted with the hopes
of preventing the intentional communication of sexually explicit material
to a minor via the World Wide Web.3 ° Opponents argued that legislation
would create an unfair burden on someone who posted something on the
Web.3' But our hope and intent was to target the pedophile who
intentionally reaches out to someone who is under the age of 17 to
communicate sexually explicit material that is harmful to minors.3 2 There
was no intent to target the individual who posts something that anyone
might access.
The statute, however, didn't do so in a way that Judge Loretta A.
Preska felt was sufficient. The Judge held that it violated the Commerce
Clause.33 The reasoning for that had to do with the fact that even if one
were communicating sexually explicit material harmful to minors with
both parties within the State of New York, the communication itself could
go outside of New York State before it came back to the intended
generally People v. Heller, 307 N.E.2d 805 (N.Y. 1973) (upholding the constitutionality of the
former definition of "obscene").
29 Compare NY PENAL LAW § 235.00(1) (McKinney 1997), with N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 235.20(6) (McKinney 1997) (utilizing extremely similar definitions of"material that is
harmful to minors" and "obscene materials").
30 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22(1) (McKinney 1998) (prohibiting the dissemination
of "indecent material to minors" while "knowing the character and content of the
communication" and "intentionally using any computer communication system allowing the
input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or computer programs from one
computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication to a person who is a minor.");
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 166 (describing the World Wide Web as a publishing forum within the
Internet).
31 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 161 (stating that "[pilaintiffs contend that the Act is
unconstitutional . . . because it unduly burdens free speech in violation of the First
Amendment.").
32 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(6) (McKinney 1989) (defining "harmful to
minors" to be "that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity,
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it: (a) Considered as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors; and (b) Is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors;
and (c) Considered as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political and scientific value for
minors.").
33 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 3 (stating that "[t]he Congress shall have power
... [t]o... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."); Pataki,
969 F. Supp. at 183 (holding that N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 violates the Commerce Clause).
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recipient. 34 The Judge went through a host of analyses in terms of why
this constituted interstate commerce. 3  Our concern and our
disappointment is that Internet pedophiles continue to face only
misdemeanor charges, the generic endangering the welfare of a child, 6
which I don't believe adequately covers a situation where a pedophile
targets a child via the Internet.
MS. STROSSEN: Thank you very much. Our next speaker is Jacob M.
Lewis, Special Counsel to the U.S. Department of Justice in the Civil
Division.
Jacob M Lewis, Esq.
MR. LEWIS:37 Good morning. I would like to thank Professor Strossen,
the New York Law School and the Journal of Human Rights for inviting
me to participate in the symposium. I am an appellate litigator with the
Department of Justice, with some experience in First Amendment issues
and the Internet. 8 Among other things, I was one of the government
attorneys involved in the recent and ultimately unsuccessful defense of the
34 Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 at 171 (stating that "a[n e-mail] message from one
New Yorker to another New Yorker may well pass through a number of states en route").
35 Id. at 173 (comparing the Internet to "railroads, trucks, and highways," and
stating that "the Internet represents an instrument of interstate commerce, albeit an innovative
one; the novelty of the technology should not obscure the fact that regulation of the Internet
impels traditional Commerce Clause considerations.").
- See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1989) (classifying "endangering the
welfare of a child" as a class A misdemeanor); Jefferson, supra note 22, at 69 (describing an
Internet pedophile who was only charged with a misdemeanor under New York law, but who
could have been charged with a felony if the crime had been committed by telephone or in a
letter).
37 Jacob M. Lewis received his J.D. (cum laude) from Harvard Law School in
1981. He is Special Counsel to the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division.
38 Mr. Lewis has argued on behalf of the United States Government in American
Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), and on behalf of the United States in
Time Warner v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Loudoun Internet indecency provisions 39 of the CDA,40 which was struck
down by the Supreme Court last term in Reno v. ACL U.41 I am not sure
whether to refer to that case as the Reno case or ACLU case, but I guess
we'll call it the Reno case today.
I must emphasize at the outset the views I express in this forum
are solely my own and don't necessarily correspond to any way to those
of the Department of Justice or the United States Government. That out
of the way, the question asked in the title of the symposium "Should
Cyberspace be a Free Speech Zone?" is, as an initial matter, quite easily
answered. At least so far as government action in the United States is
concerned, cyberspace, like real space, is governed by the First
Amendment and its prohibition of legislative enactments abridging the
freedom of the speech, or of the press. 42 In this sense, at least, cyberspace
is undoubtedly a free speech zone.
But I take it the symposium's title was meant to suggest a
somewhat different question -- whether, because of the special
characteristics of cyberspace, speech in that realm should be free from all
or virtually all regulation -- which I find to be a much broader and more
controversial proposition.43 The extent to which the First Amendment
permits government to regulate speech on the Internet is a question that
the courts are only now beginning to examine. Thus, the Supreme Court's
decision in Reno makes clear that the CDA's Internet indecency provisions
" See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(aXl)(A)(ii) (1991) (referring to "indecent" material); 47
U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B) (1991) (referring to "patently offensive" material).40 See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110
Stat. 56, 133-35 (1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223, originally enacted as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1934).41 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
42 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2332 (explaining that the First Amendment was violated
by provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 that prohibited transmission of
obscene or indecent communications by means of a telecommunication device and prohibited
sending patently offensive communications to persons under the age of eighteen through the use
of an interactive computer device).
43 See Jeffery L. Cox, Defining a New Medium of Communication Under the First
Amendment, 22 NOVA L. REV. 763, 764-65 (1998) (stating that the Court has provided the
Internet with the broadest possible First Amendment protection).
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are unconstitutional,44 but it does not answer the question of whether other
statutes, more carefully crafted, might survive judicial scrutiny. Already
there are federal legislative proposals to prohibit the commercial
distribution of materials on the World Wide Web that are "harmful to
minors," as well as proposals to require libraries with Internet access to
certify to the Federal Communications Commission that their computers
filter material which is inappropriate for minors before they can qualify for
telephone service at reduced charges.
I don't propose today to discuss the specific issues raised by these
and other legislative proposals. It does seem to me that an informed
analysis of the First Amendment's applications to cyberspace can benefit
from the recognition that the Internet is not unlike more traditional
communication and information media.
The Intemet, broadly speaking, is a means for communication and
for information retrieval. In its communicative aspect, Intemet speech has
been likened to more traditional means of conversation. E-mail, it is said,
is like a letter sent through the post office or a communication over
telephone lines. Chat rooms have been described as analogous to a
telephone party line, and a Web site permits publication of information to
the world at large, providing individuals or companies with a visible yet
relatively inexpensive soapbox or printing press, or even, with the advent
of video and audio software, their own broadcast studio.45 By the same
token, the ability to retrieve information over the Internet has led some to
describe cyberspace as a vast library or bookstore.46
44 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346 (explaining that the use of the terms "indecent" and
"patently offensive," as used in the Communications Decency Act of 1996, were so vague as
to violate the Free Speech and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution).
45 See Jonathan Wallace & Michael Green, Bridging the Analogy Gap: The
Interne4 the Printing Press, and Freedom of Speech, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 711,743 (1997)
(analogizing the Internet to either a "virtual printing press or a virtual town hall"); see also
Symposium, Legal Issues of Broadcasting on the Internet: Licensing Issues on the Internet,
14 TouRo L. REv. 7 (1997) (stating that amateurs can use the Internet as a means of
broadcasting); see generally Richard P. Hermann II, Who is Liable for On-Line Libel?, 8 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 423,427 (1996) (describing how the Internet provides a variety of information
to people all over the world).
46 See Wallace & Green, supra note 45, at 746 (discussing the Internet's capacity
to "distribute text created by other people (acting as a bookstore) or store text (acting as a
library").
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This identity with the real world is not perfect. As far as the
Internet is concerned, the librarian or owner is nowhere to be found, books
and other publications pile up in no particular order, and there is a
never-ending stream of acquisitions open to customers at all hours of the
day or night. In other respects, the Internet is or is rapidly becoming a
gigantic shopping mall, albeit one increasingly papered with every form of
banner advertising, seemingly occupied by a hodgepodge of computer
repairers, airline ticket offices and, yes, sexually explicit businesses.
Finally, outside of the First Amendment context, the Internet has
been likened by Professor Burk, as well as Judge Preska in the Pataki
case, which struck down New York's CDA on Commerce Clause
grounds,47 to a conduit or pipeline.48 A pipeline analogy takes account of
the fact the Internet's connections can be used for the transmission of
digitized products such as software, images or publications, as well as for
communication.
As even this brief examination shows, the uniqueness of the
Internet stems less from the fact it is like nothing the world has ever seen,
but it is like many things the world has seen. In large part it may be the
number and variety of the means by which the Internet facilitates
communication and information retrieval, rather than the uniqueness of its
methods, that makes the Internet special.
What does this mean for government regulation of speech on the
Internet? For one thing, it suggests that, so far as speakers are concerned,
it may be more difficult to regulate the Internet as a whole than its
constituent parts. What may be appropriate regulation for a broadcast may
not be appropriate for a telephone conversation, and what may work for
commercial transactions in a shopping mall may not work for lending by
a library.
That there are important analogies between speech activities in
cyberspace and those in the real world also suggest that cyberspeech
47 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp at 173 (explaining that the New York statute making it
a crime to use a computer communications system to transfer sexually explicit materials to
minors violated the Commerce Clause).
48 See id. (stating that the Internet is more than a means of communication; it also
serves as a conduit for transporting digital goods, including software, data, music, graphics, and
video which can be downloaded from the provider's site to the Internet user's computer).
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cannot be entirely immune from regulation. The telephone is an important
means of communication, but that has never prevented government from
enacting laws regulating telephone harassment or permitting persons to
refuse unwanted mail. Similarly, brick and mortar bookstores can be
required to use blinder racks and create adult-only sections to prevent
children from gaining unrestricted access to sexually explicit material, just
as they can be prohibited from selling such materials to minors at all.
False and fraudulent advertising can be prohibited, and the speech of
publishers in real space is constrained at least in part by laws pertaining to
libel49 and defamation.
50
To be sure, it often takes affirmative effort to retrieve information
on the Internet. Thus an offending Web site need not be visited, or an
offending e-mail may be deleted before it is read (assuming the presence
of such material is apparent from the site's description or the e-mail's
header). But this aspect of the Internet is no answer where sexually
explicit material and minors is concerned, since such material draws their
attention and minors are all too ready to download material that may be
inappropriate for them. In this regard, sexually explicit material is a form
of cyberspace attractive nuisance. Filtering or blocking software may
provide part of the answer, but it remains to be seen whether such
software will turn out to be a practical option for today's parents, who
often rely, too often, on their more technically literate children to program
their VCR's.
Their predicament reminds me of a comment made by one of my
law school classmates, now a partner in a large New York law firm, who
professed to have no concerns about the workings of the filtering software
installed on his family computer. This is because, he stated, if any
problems with the software arose, he would just ask his preteen son to fix
them. After all, he said, it was his son who had installed the software in
49 See generally New York v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468, 479 (1997) (concluding
that conduct which included advertising false information on the Internet violated the New York
State consumer fraud statutes).
50 See generally New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297-98 (1964)
(announcing a constitutional standard which prohibits a public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with "actual malice').
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the first place.
More generally, the question arises whether the imprecision of
Web search engines, combined with the failure to channel or order
information on the Internet, serves as a deterrent to the Internet's full use.
The fear is that the Internet is or will become not afree speech zone but
a free fire zone, where cybersurfers have no way of knowing what lies
beyond the next virtual comer.
Part of the continuing interest in the regulation of the Internet
speech results in the concern that if reasonable and limited protections are
not established, the Internet will fail to achieve its promise as a mass
medium of education and information. At this point, candor requires me
to note that the Supreme Court in Reno found this to be a "singularly
unpersuasive" observation,"M in light of the Intemet's "phenomenal"
growth.52 But I wonder whether that growth is not in large part due to
surface and superficial use of this new medium. 53 Millions of Americans
now have access to the Internet at home, at work and at school and in
libraries, but access does not equal use, and many of those with access to
the Internet do not use it at all. Others rely on it overwhelmingly for
e-mail, and I suspect even the most frequent users simply stop in to visit
a particular site as they would turn on the radio to hear the latest news,
sports and weather.
The challenge for free speech on the Internet is to encourage the
public to dive into rather than to surf the Internet, to take the fullest
advantage of its many resources. In the end, it will not matter if speakers
on the Internet can say what they want if there is no one there to listen.
Thank you.
MS. STROSSEN: Thank you. Our next speaker is Maurice J. Freedman,
director of the Westchester Library System.
51 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351.
52 See id.
53 id.
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Maurice J Freedman
MR- FREEDMAN:54 What is the Westchester Library System (WLS) and
what Internet services does WLS provide for its library users? WLS is d
cooperative public library system chartered by the State of New York to
serve the 38 independent and autonomous public libraries of Westchester
County.
Among other services, WLS operates and manages an online
library, database and Internet gateway system for the libraries. The
Internet gateway provides access to the World Wide Web and several
Web-based services for users at approximately 250 PCs at the library
sites.55
At present, the only formal limitations placed on the use of these
Web PCs I am aware of are as follows: 56 1) Libraries may restrict use of
Internet accessible PC's by length of time per session, depending upon the
waiting list of people who also wish such access 57 and 2) The Web
browser, that is the program that permits the user to access the World
Wide Web and visit the myriad of sites on the Web, is Netscape.58 WLS
has configured the Netscape software so users cannot use the Netscape
program to do e-mail or to access chat-rooms. Note that this does not
prohibit users from sending e-mail or entering chat-rooms by going to
given Web sites that provide such services. There are also informal
restrictions that are exercised on a library-by-library basis. In some
54 Mr. Freedman manages a library agency serving 38 public libraries whose
communities have a population of 875,000 people. He holds a Masters in Library Science from
the University of California, Berkley and a Doctorate in Library and Information Studies from
Rutgers University.
55 The WLS homepage from which its Internet services are provided is
http://www.wls.lib.ny.us.
56 Note that since the libraries are independent and autonomous (unlike the
branches of the three New York City libraries, the Brooklyn, New York, and Queens Borough
libraries), local discretion is exercised.
57 See Emily Whitfield & Ann Beeson, Censorship in a Box: Blocking Software
Is Wrong for Libraries, CABLE TV & NEw MEDIA L. & FIN., Sept. 1, 1998, at 16 (outlining
restrictions libraries can impose on Internet use).
58 See id. (describing Netscape Navigator as a commonly used web browser).
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libraries, if the librarian sees the user viewing what he or she deems to be
pornographic images, the librarian may direct the user to view that
material from a PC at home or someplace other than the library. WLS
libraries, as a principled matter of individual privacy and intellectual
freedom, have a policy of not interfering with what sites people visit or
what they view. 59 Lastly, some libraries have the informal policy that
users may do e-mail by going to sites that support e-mail (e.g. Hot Mail)
while others forbid such use.
There are other defacto limitations and they are economic. Some
libraries have many PCs, while others have very few. Some libraries
charge for printouts on a per page basis (prices vary from library to
library), while other libraries don't charge at all. Other than these formal
or informal restrictions, there are no limitations placed on the users of the
Internet PCs in the public libraries of Westchester County.
The Westchester Library System and its public library members
believe that access to constitutionally protected speech should not have
formal limits placed on it, and that Internet sites within the framework of
such speech must be accessible and not restricted. This position is
consistent with the overall policy of intellectual freedom adopted by the
American Library Association and the Westchester Library System.
60
In ALA v. Pataki,61 the Westchester Library System was one of the
co-plaintiffs. 62  Governor Pataki's "harmful to minors" law63 was
59 See Westchester Library System, WLS Internet Policy (visited Oct. 26, 1998)
<http://www.wls.lib.ny.us/wls/policy.html> (describing the WLS policy of absolute freedom of
Internet use as one where "[tihe system and its member libraries do not monitor and have no
control over the information accessed through the Internet and they cannot be held responsible
for the content of the networked information available through its Internet connection.").
6 0 See Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS Comm & ENT. L. J. 453,
478 (1997) (describing the ALA's position of unrestricted access to information resources).
61 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
62 See id. at 161-62 (listing the plaintiffs in the suit, which included the American
Library Association, Freedom to Read Foundation, Inc., New York Library Association,
Westchester Library System, American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, Association
of American Publishers, Magazine Publishers of America, Interactive Digital Software
Association, Public Access Networks Corporation, ECHO, New York City Net, Art on the Net,
Peacefire, and American Civil Liberties Union).
63 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 1998); see also Pataki, 969 F. Supp.
at 163-64 (outlining the New York Act).
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perceived as a grave threat to the public libraries' mission to serve the
citizens of Westchester County by providing access to information in all
formats, including Internet access. 64 The law made it a felony to provide
access to information in electronic format that was "harmful to minors. 65
In addition to the "harmful to minors" provision of the law there
was a section that prohibited solicitation of minors for sexual acts or
related activity.66 To those participating in the suit, the "illegality of
pedophilia" provision 67 was not contested because of the plaintiffs
agreement that solicitation by adults for sexual acts involving minors is
and should be a felony.68 The plaintiffs understanding was that such
solicitation was already illegal, 69 and that the extant laws making it illegal
64 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 172-73 (stating that the Internet is a means of both
commercial and non-profit communication, and as such, .the Act places an undue burden on the
interstate traffic of goods, services, and ideas).
65.See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(6) (McKinney 1998) (defining "harmful to
minors" as "that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it: (a) Considered as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors; and (b) Is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors;
and (c) Considered as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political and scientific value for
minors.").
66 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 1998) (providing that it is a crime to
initiate or engage in computer-assisted communication with a minor if that individual knows the
content and character of the communication and depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual
conduct or sado-masochistic abuse).
67 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22 (McKinney 1998) (providing that "[a] person is
guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree when: 1. knowing the
character and content of the communication which, in whole or in part, depicts actual or
simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors, he
intentionally uses any computer communication system allowing the input, output, examination
or transfer, of computer data or computer programs from one computer to another, to initiate or
engage in such communication with a person who is a minor; and 2. by means of such
communication he importunes, invites or induces a minor to engage in sexual intercourse,
deviate sexual intercourse, or sexual conduct with him, or to engage in a sexual performance,
obscene sexual performance, or sexual conduct for his benefit.").
g See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 177-78 (accepting that the protection of children
against pedophilia is a legitimate state objective, which was also acknowledged by the defendants
in the suit).
69 Id. at 174 (stating that one party testified at trial that he removed several images
from a Web site because he feared prosecution under the New York Act); see also Judith F.
Krug, American Library Ass 'n v. Pataki, Declaration ofJudith F Krug (last modified October
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applied to solicitation via electronic transmission as well as verbally, in
writing, over the phone or by any other medium of communication.
70
Interestingly, the portion of that law concerning access to material
that is "harmful to minors" did exempt commercial Internet service
providers,71 that is, those businesses that have provided access but did not
participate in the promotion or selection of what would be viewed or used
by customers. Ann Beeson, a great ACLU attorney, may state this better,
but the point is America's providers, ISP's, clearly were exempted from
prosecution by this law.72 On the other hand, it was an open question
whether the Westchester Library System and other libraries were exempt
from liability as were the ISPs.
For example, WLS contracts with an ISP, Netcom, to gain access
to the Internet for its library users. The law, as per counsel's advice,
exempted Netcom but not necessarily WLS.73 Consequently, WLS signed
31, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/court'nyedakrug.html> (declaring that the ALA maintained the
position that libraries may select any work that may be obtained legally or any work that has not
been declared obscene or otherwise not protected by the First Amendment by a court of law).
70 See Patala, 969 F. Supp. at 178, n.9 (explaining that while the Act literally
applied to communications which depict images which are harmful to minors, "depict" also
includes presentation of material to minors in text and pictures); see generally id. at 165
(describing the various ways in which materials may be transmitted over the Internet, including
the presentation of visual images, as well as audio communications).
7' See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.24(1) (McKinney 1998) (providing that no person
is liable if the service "provides access to [any site] not under the person's control... [and] do
not include the creation of the content of the communication"). This statute would exempt the
popular Internet Service Providers (ISP's). Id.
72 See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 833; Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp.
135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that CompuServe was merely a distributor and could not be
held liable for statements of subscribers in the absence of an opportunity to review those
statements before distribution); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996) (providing that no
Internet Service Provider shall be treated as the publisher of, or held liable for, any information
provided by another information content provider).
73 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 23 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA)
1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), motion for renewal denied, 24 Media L. Rep. 1126 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995) (holding that Prodigy could be held liable as a publisher, not just a distributor, of
defamatory statements made by virtue of their screening policy which eliminated obscene and
derogatory terms and by which Prodigy retained the right to delete material that was off topic,
in bad taste, or which otherwise did not meet their guidelines); see also Judith F. Krug,
American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, Declaration of Judith F. Krug (last modified October 31,
1998) <http://www.aclu.org/courtlnycdakrug.html> (declaring that the plaintiffs in the suit could
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on as a plaintiff in the Pataki litigation.74 WLS wanted to protect its staff
and institutions from prosecution for the use made of Internet PCs in its
public libraries.75 Fortunately, the court ruled against the State of New
York and found the "harmful to minors" provisions unconstitutional.76
Librarians, particularly those in Westchester, breathed an enormous sigh
of relief
Our deep concern was that Westchester libraries could be put in
the position of having to expend precious funds to defend themselves and
prove that they should be exempt from arrest and prosecution. In addition,
the wonderful public support currently enjoyed by Westchester's public
libraries might be subject to some erosion because of the publicity
generated by such a lawsuit.
The State of New York's obscenity laws specifically identify and
exempt public libraries from prosecution for housing or circulating
"obscene" materials. 77 Clearly the importance of freedom of inquiry and
the potential of inquiry-chilling liability was recognized by the State's
legislators in protecting access to the collections of public libraries. Again,
the print and other non-electronically transmitted information were free
from prosecution under the state's obscenity laws. A related point is that
the reason WLS joined the ALA v. Pataki suit was because it was our
perception that we were vulnerable to arrest, fairly or otherwise, under that
statute.78 Had libraries been exempted, as they are under the obscenity
law,79 it is unlikely WLS would have participated in the suit.
not determine whether libraries could be held liable for making materials available on a Web site
that might be deemed harmful to minors, as it is unclear what actions the Act prohibits).
74 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (WLS was the only library in New York State
to sign on as a plaintiff).
75 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 161; see also Frank Eltman, Library Group, Others
File Lawsuit to Fight Internet Law, TIMEs UNION, Jan. 15, 1997, at B2; Matthew Gunn,
American Library Association v. Pataki, 8 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 221,222 (1997).
76 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 183-84 (holding that although protecting children
from pedophilia was a laudable state goal, the New York law violates the Commerce Clause by
unduly interfering with commerce and activities of people in other states).77See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.10 (McKinney 1998).
78 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22 (McKinney 1998) (making the act of
disseminating indecent material to minors a Class D felony only if done through a computer
communication system).
79See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.10 (McKinney 1998).
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People have advocated the use of software filters as a means for
protecting minors, and perhaps adults as well, from "harmful material."
Screening software fails to prevent access from all of the sites that it
attempts to keep children and others from accessing. It also prevents
access to sites falling under the category of constitutionally protected: for
example, sites concerned with sex education, the poet Anne Sexton, and
sites such as Super Bowl XXX because of the three XXXs. You may
remember Pete Rozelle's way of promoting the Super Bowl used Roman
numerals. Hence you had XXX as Super Bowl 30, and those three X's
were picked up by most, if not all, of the screening software programs.
Some filtering software also screens out sites that carry information and
analyses critical of the company that produced the program.80 I will not
further belabor here the shortcomings of screening software, but will note
that the site www.peacefire.org, managed by teens, is dedicated to
demonstrating the deficiencies of all of the screening software on the
market. Peacefire succeeds admirably.
The library's position is the parents, and not the library and
librarians, are and should be responsible for what their children view on
the Internet and how they use the Internet. Unlike the schools, public
libraries are not in loco parentis.81 To date, the public libraries of
Westchester County have chosen not to employ filtering software because
of the virtual impossibility of the software achieving what it was created
to accomplish, and because it denies access to information that is
constitutionally protected speech.
I had the pleasure and good fortune to attend a presentation by
New York State Attorney General Vacco and his Internet task force in the
80 See John Schwartz, Screening Test; You Know There's Stuff on the Internet that
Your Kid Probably Shouldn 't See. How Much Can Filtering Software Do -- and What Else
Can You Do on Your Own?, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1998, at N37 (comparing filtering software
packages and discussing how Cybersitter bans Web sites which are critical of it); see also News
Digest: Net Filter Wages Spain War on Critic, DIGITAL KIDS REPORT, Mar. 1, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 11695366 (discussing Cybersitter's ban on critical Web sites); Richard Colbey,
Gloves Off in Net Porn Battle, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 30, 1997, at 4 (discussing
Cybersitter's ban on cites which are critical to its software).
I Cf. Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1995) (discussing
general requirements for in loco parentis); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675,684 (1986) (acknowledging school authorities act in locoparentis).
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New Rochelle Public Library last Wednesday, February 25th, 1998.
Participating as well were staff from the Office of the Westchester County
District Attorney, Jeanine Ferris Pirro. The attorney general's office has
created a series of guidelines and information on how parents can protect
their children from information on the Internet that parents deem harmful
or otherwise objectionable.82 What was particularly satisfying was the
consistency of the Attorney General's position with that of the public
libraries, namely that the ultimate control over what a child is permitted to
access on the Internet is the parent's responsibility. In our research for
ALA v. Pataki,83 we demonstrated the total impracticality and the
financially overwhelming costs of endeavoring to limit Internet access to
adults, to monitor what children were viewing on the Internet PCs, and to
screen the million-plus full text articles from 1,500 different periodicals
and 600,000 catalog records accessible from the WLS Web site,
www.wls.lib.ny.us, by library users. I will not go into all of the kinds of
control that were unworkable, but wholly aside from the First Amendment
and public library intellectual freedom considerations, Westchester public
libraries found that it would be totally impractical and financially
disastrous to attempt to assure the protection of children from electronic
access to materials that might be interpreted as "harmful" to them. The
whole point, according to its defenders, was that the Pataki law was
needed for the prosecution of child pornographers and pedophiles. The
Attorney General's staff, however, found that felony prosecutions were not
at all dependent on Pataki.
Thanks to the attorney general's task force, child pornographers
and pedophiles using the Internet are being prosecuted or will be
prosecuted for such activity.8 4 In an answer to a direct question, one of
the attorneys made the point that existing laws were sufficient to obtain
felony convictions against those who were distributing child pornography
82 Dennis C. Vacco, Tips on Protecting Your Family on the Internet (visited Oct.
30, 1998) <http://www.oag.state.ny.us/intemet/safety-net.html>.
83 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
84 See also New York State Attorney General's Office, Vacco Zaps Worldwide
Child Pornography E-Network (visited Oct. 31, 1998) <http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/
oct98/oct28_98.html> (discussing how the Attorney General's Internet Child Pornography
Initiative arrested and shut down an online organization of child pornographers).
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or soliciting minors for sexual purposes via the Internet. I recognize that
that is in variance with what District Attorney Pirro has stated and I am not
the one to resolve that. Where I will express some deep anger is as
follows: During the New Rochelle presentation, a Vacco attorney using
America OnLine as its Internet connection entered a private chat room and
downloaded a child pornography photograph file. If the Pataki law had
been in force, America Online would have been exempt from prosecution
because of how AOL and such companies were defined and exempted by
law.
On the other hand, if a user at a public library had downloaded the
same image, the librarian or library could have been subject to prosecution
under the law. If we can stipulate that the motives of those who advocate
the passage of these laws is the protection of children, then our legislators
should be satisfied that existing laws already provide that protection, at
least according to the Attorney General of New York State. Thus, the
State and everyone else should have been spared the expense and time of
such court cases as ALA v. Pataki.85 Our solons also will be spared the
accusation of being bought by lobbyists because they exempted AOL and
other ISPs while leaving such other institutions as the public library
potentially liable to prosecution.
Public libraries must be free. The historic role of the public
library is to provide the citizens of our country access to the information
that they need to successfully participate in our society, to make our
democracy work, and to be able to pursue inquiries and interests in diverse
subjects without fear of reprisal or loss of privacy. The Internet as a
source of information brings its own host of problems. Neither
authenticity, accuracy, nor comprehensiveness can be assumed from any
information garnered from the Internet. The public library, however,
serves as a forum for information and ideas. It is ultimately the
individual's responsibility to determine what he or she chooses to read or
view, accept or reject, believe or disbelieve, be offended by or find
acceptable or deem accurate or inaccurate. It's been the public library's
role for 150 years and I hope and trust it will continue to play that role for
at least another 150 years, irrespective of the medium by which
85 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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information is communicated. Thank you.
MS. STROSSEN: Thank you very much. Our next speaker is Ron K.L.
Collins, who is, among other things, book review editor of Jurist, a Web
site for law professors.
Ronald KL. Collins
MR. COLLINS:16  A half-century ago, Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn
87
stormed into the world of First Amendment law with his Free Speech and
its Relation to Self-Government.88 Meiklejohn's radicalism (absolute
protection for self-governing political speech) seems tame by today's post-
McCarthy era standards. That same radicalism, it is well to remember,
brought Meiklejohn to conclude that not all media are to be treated equally
for First Amendment purposes. 89 Hence, his reservations about absolute
protection for commercial radio and television. The medium mattered.
Something of the same mindset informed the Supreme Court's
ruling in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,90 decided two decades ago. There,
a bare majority of the Justices allowed the FCC to ban comedian George
Carlin's monologue from the broadcast airwaves during certain daytime
8 Ronald Collins is a writer and consultant for various public interest groups in
Washington D.C. Currently, he heads a national First Amendment campaign to repeal food-
disparagement laws. Mr. Collins, formerly a law professor, has taught constitutional,
commercial, and criminal law. He has written appellate briefs for the National ACLU and its
state affiliates.
87 See CYNTHIA STOKES BROWN & ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN: TEACHER OF
FREEDOM vi-vii (1981) (explaining that Dr. Meiklejohn was a theorist of free speech, a writer,
a teacher of philosophy at Brown University, President of Amherst College, and founder of the
Experimental College at the University of Wisconsin).
88 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); see also Max Lerner, Man & SocialAnimal, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13,
1948, at 21 (describing Meiklejohn as an "unrelenting radical").
89 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE xv, xvi, 87 (1960) (stating that commercial electronic media are not
entitled to First Amendment protection).
90 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
[VOL. XV
19981 First Amendment Rights in Cyberspace 23
hours.9' In notable measure, Justice John Paul Stevens justified this
otherwise impermissible abridgement of free speech on the grounds that
since "each medium of expression presents special First Amendment
problems, 92 the govemment's power to regulate is greater where
broadcast radio and TV are involved.93 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Lewis Powell echoed this thinking,9 4 given what he termed "the unique
characteristics of the broadcast media .... , Here too, though for
different reasons, the medium mattered.
This bifurcated vision of the First Amendment carried over to
Reno v. ACL U,96 or at least so it seems. For there, true to the bifurcation
principle, 97 Justice Stevens declined to limit cyberspace freedoms to
9' Id. at 750-51.
" Id. at 747.
93 See Richard G. Passler, Comment, Regulation of Indecent Radio Broadcasts:
George Carlin Revisited - What Does the Future Hold for the Seven "Dirty" Words?, 65 TUL.
L. REv. 131, 136 (1990) (arguing that the government's power to regulate broadcast radio and
television is greater because of its "uniquely pervasive presence" in American homes and the
easy access that children have).
94 See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 756-59 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (stating that Justice Powell agreed with the majority opinion that the ruling was
"narrowly tailored to the facts before the court," therefore indicating that the ruling would only
effect broadcast media and would only have an effect when the facts were similar to this case).
9' Id. at 762 (Powell, J., concurring). The Pacifica Court's sensitivity to the
medium employed for expression was based, in large part, on the following argument: "the
broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.
Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only
in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder." Id. at 738. For a recent and thoughtful
critique of Pacifica and its "pervasiveness" rationale regarding the broadcast medium, see
Jonathan D. Wallace, The Specter of Pervasiveness: Pacifica, New Media, and Freedom of
Speech (visited Nov. 21, 1998) <http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-035.html>.
' 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); see also Stanley Ingber, The First Amendment in
Modern Garb: Retaining System Legitimacy - A Review Essay of Lucas Powe's American
Broadcasting and the First Amendment, 56 GEo. WASH, L. REv. 187, 194 (1987) (explaining
that the bifurcation of the mass media occurs within the First Amendment context since courts
have stressed the historical right of the press to write whatever they want and be free from
government scrutiny, while in contrast, broadcast media's speech has been limited by courts and
government agencies).
97 See Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist
Approach to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273,
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broadcast radio standards. "[T]hese cases," he wrote, "provide no basis
for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied
to the Intemet."98 This declaration came mindful of Pacifica, seemingly
reaffirming it. Thus: One rule for broadcast radio, another for the
Intemet. This is consistent with the Pacifica maxim that First Amendment
freedoms are medium-dependent. Of course, even this maxim is
vulnerable to technological deconstruction.
At bottom, both Dr. Meiklejohn's vision and Justice Stevens'
maxim derived from a view of media segregation; that is, rules of law
based on delineating media -- e.g. oral, print, broadcast. Admittedly,
cultures (and life in them) shape and are shaped by different media in
varying ways. Thus, a society may be more sensitive to the content of
"prime-time" TV than to that of a printed monograph with limited
circulation. But such communicative demarcations -- as Plato silently
suggested in the Phaedrus99 -- are difficult to border, both in law and
culture.100 This is because technology begins to collapse one medium into
another. For, after all, the oral tradition survived because of scribality;
later, printed books were acted out; still later, motion came to pictures;
and sound inevitably came to the cinema. The media could not remain
static. 101 So too with the new technology and the Internet -- that medium
for which there are to be no qualifications on the level of First Amendment
scrutiny. 102
Question: How does the technological phenomenon of
1307 (1983) (noting that a bifurcation of meaning exists in the concept of "reasonable time,
place, and manner" regulations which limit First Amendment rights).
9SReno, 117 S. Ct. at 2332.
99 See JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION 61-171 (Barbara Jordon trans., 1981);
G.R. F. FERRARi, LISTENING TO THE CICADAS: A STUDY OF PLATO'S PHAEDRUS 204-232;
Alexander Nehamas & Paul Woodruff, Introduction to PLATO, PHAEDRUS xxxiv-xxxvii
(Nehamas & Woodruff trans., 1995).
1oo See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Pornographic State, 107
HARv. L. REv. 1374, 1381-82 (1994).
01 See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 509,
535-36 (1992).
"'2SeeReno, 117 S. Ct. at 2332.
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convergence10 3 change Meiklejohn's theories and Stevens' doctrines? For
example, what about radio on the Internet? That is, what happens as a
matter of First Amendment law and theory when the two media converge?
Or what happens when the regulated medium of Pacifica converges with
the unregulated medium of Reno? Will the law of the First Amendment
change to reflect the changes in the media? Or will the Pacifica principle
be extended to the Internet? 10 4 To date, such questions about radio (not
to mention television) have been left unanswered, if only because the law
has yet to catch up with the advances in technology.
In these necessarily abbreviated remarks, I raise some new
questions about some old ideas. By pointing to a few new technological
developments, I invite others to begin to consider just how much the cyber
medium may necessitate a reconsideration of past doctrine when applied
to our ever-changing system of global communication. I do this by way
of some descriptions of and reflections upon Internet radio. Of course, the
logic of my arguments need not be confined to that medium. In fact, that
is precisely my point; namely, that it may no longer be possible to delimit
media for First Amendment doctrinal purposes, at least not categorically
so.
Today, millions of Americans use computers with audio
capacities. 10 5 Such computers allow users to listen to compact discs, play
audio-video games, and even listen to Internet radio. Net radio represents
103 see ALEXANDER IEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE Xv-xvi (1960); see also Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The
Death of Discourse 27-29; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.
104 The Pacifica logic has already been extended beyond broadcast radio. See
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1976)
(indecency, "reverse blocking" and cable TV); see also Playboy Entertainment Group v. United
States, 945 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del., 1996), aff'dmem. op., 117 S. Ct. 1309 (1997) (scrambling
requirement for indecent programs on cable TV).
105 See, e.g., The MiTList of Radio Stations on the Internet (visited Oct. 27, 1998)
<http://wmbr.mit.edu/staions/about.html> (listing 6,000 international and national stations that
may be visited by web surfers); see also Yahoo! Web Directories (visited Oct. 27, 1998)
<http://www.dir.yahoo.com/News-andMedia/Radio/WebDirectories> (listing links available
to Internet radio listeners); Frank Ahrens, The Radio Waves of the Future, WASH. POST., Jan.
21, 1999, at C1.
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a radio revolution in sound and substance. It knows no borders,10 6 has no
frequency, is not beholden to the Federal Communications Commission,
and offers a variety of audio programming 107 to anyone whose computer
has speakers, as most new models do. What is amazing, at least as an
historical matter, is the relative absence of any direct governmental
regulation of Internet radio. It has burst upon the American scene with
little fanfare but with much promising acceptance. Already, some 40
million Web users have downloaded RealAudio software, 08 thus allowing
the Internet to buzz with radio programs from all parts of the globe. 109 The
radio format, be it musical" 0 or conversational,"' or news 1 2 is being
revived and reshaped in cyberspace. 113
Currently, the Web site Broadcast. coM'14 (formerly AudioNet)
features numerous worldwide links to traditional radio stations ("earth
stations") with Internet counterparts. 115 More importantly, it also services
'
0 6 See, e.g., Best of the Net <http://goan.com/radio.html> (listing the International
Radio Web site).
17 See, e.g., Yahoo! <http://www.yahoo.com/News and Media/Radio/ Programs>
(listing links on the Yahoo! search engine to Internet radio sites).
108 See RealNetworks (visited Oct. 29, 1998) <http://www.realnetworks.com/>
(giving various information about the software).
109 See generally Hari Kunzru, Pirates Invade the Web, WIRED, Dec. 1997, at 192;
Wayne Bremser, Pump Up the Volume, COMPUTER LIFE, Jan. 1998, at 90.
... See Jim Ladd, Station2000 (visited Dec. 28, 1998) <http://
www.station2000.com> (mostly archived rock music programming derived from earlier radio
broadcast programming).
111 See BBC World Service, BBC Online <http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice>;
Annonline, Welcome to Ann On-Line <http://www.annonline.com> (archived audio interviews
with authors and others).
112 See Darryl Adler, Bloomberg Embraces the Web; Darryl Adler Talks to
Michael Bloomberg, Who Has Built Up a Major Media Business from Scratch in Just 16
Years, NEW MEDIA AGE, Jan. 22, 1998, at 10. The Bloomberg Web site may be found at
http://www.bloomberg.com/wbbr/index.html. Id.
113 The Association of Internet and Radio (AIR) has been formed to further the
private development and public acceptance of Net radio. AIR's Web site is located at
http://www.aironline.org.
114 See Broadcast.com, Broadcast.com Home <http://www.broadcast.com>; Steve
Knopper, Anatomy of a Web Site: Audionet, YAHOo! MAGAZrNE, Mar. 1998, at 69-70.
115 See, e.g., King FM 98.1 Radio, Broadcasting Classical Music on Seattle Radio
(visited Nov. 23, 1998) <http://www.king.org> (netcasting its regular programming live).
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"Internet- only radio" stations with no "earth" FCC-regulated host. In this
cyberrealm, virtually anyone can become a netcaster." 6  Take, for
example, "Rip-off Radio." It airs in cyberspace, live every Tuesday from
8-10 p.m. (CST). Despite its rebellious name, Rip-off Radio pays its legal
dues -- i.e., music licensing fees. All of its music programs and audio
clips are archived for replay anytime, anywhere. It is rather like
underground FM radio in the late 1960s. Rip-off Radio was conceived
and is operated by Bill Turner and Philip Crabtree. "No mega-hits ... no
format, no rules, no standards,"'117 is how they bill it on their Web site.
The program is "for the person with an open mind," says Crabtree.
118
Such carefree netcasting is, understandably, far more commonplace in
cyberspace than on government regulated broadcast media.119 Not
surprisingly, the airing of George Carlin's infamous "Seven-dirty words"
monologue, the text version of which is on the Net,12 0 cannot be far off.
Already, the two cybercasters have aired some comedy skits spiced with
several of the notorious dirty words. 121 Says Turner: "While we have not
yet played Carlin's monologue, we are not opposed to playing it in the
future."1
22
Consider: If George Carlin's "indecent" skit 23 is presented on
116 See Talk Net Radio, TalkNetRadio (visited Jan. 14, 1999) <http://www.
talknetradio.com> (allowing Internet users "to create and broadcast original programming).
"7 See The Big Rip-Off: A Denial of Genre (visited Dec. 26, 1998) <http://www.
broadcast.com/shows/thebigrip-off/default.asp>.
118 Telephone interview with Philip Crabtree, December 31, 1997.
119 See Matthew Nelson, White House's Magaziner Says Internet Should Stay
Unregulated (visited Nov. 2, 1998) <http://www.inforworld.com/cgi-bin/displayStory.pl?
980429.wimagaziner.html> (indicating that there is no true necessity to regulate the Internet).
120 The full text of the Carlin monologue as reported by the United States Supreme
Court has been posted in cyberspace at http://www.lclark.edu/-jbradley/carlin.html.
121 See The Big Rip-Off? A Denial of Genre (Jan. 27, 1998 neteast)<http://
www.audionet.com/shows/thebigrip-of/radio.htm>.
122 Telephone interview with Bill Turner (Dec. 31, 1997). Net radio aside, Carlin's
boldest words, though not his monologue, are already on the Web in audio form at
http://www.tesnet.net/bagliong/carlin/index.html.
123 See STEVEN H. SHTFFRiN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 80-81 (1990) (explaining why the Carlin skit ought to enjoy full First Amendment
protection); see also THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. PowE, JR., REGULATING
BROADCASTING PROGRAMMING 196-202 (1994).
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FCC regulated "earth radio" it may be banned from afternoon
programs. 124 If, however, the same skit is aired on the Internet, say on
Rip-off Radio, it probably enjoys full First Amendment protection
regardless of when it is heard. And if the same station has both broadcast
and Internet capacities, the former may be regulated while the latter
probably may not. This is true despite the fact that the Internet radio
audience may far outnumber the broadcast radio audience, and
notwithstanding the possibility that more minors than adults listen to the
Web station.
The Supreme Court's 1978 ruling regulating radio content turned
very much on the fact that the objectionable program was heard on a car
radio by a father and his young son. 125 But that legally significant fact is
also being undermined by technology, which is readily outpacing the law
of the land.
Take, for example, the advent of "Web cars," i.e. vehicles
equipped with computers offering Internet access.1 26  Daimler-Benz
Research and Technology Center has already released a prototype "Web
car."' 127 Such inventions are perhaps among the most significant
developments of their kind since Motorola brought radio to cars back in
1929. Similarly, Intel has already unveiled its own Internet car, a Citroen
Xsara outfitted with Intel's "Connected Car PC technology.'
' 28
While such Web cars are still a few years away from mass
production, there are other technological developments: Net radio is
coming to cars. Personal computers are already finding their way into
autos even before the Web cars hit the road. For example, both Microsoft
and Intel have are about to put PCs in cars by way of a small voice-
124 See generally Alan Bash, Court Narrows Times Indecent Shows Can A ir, USA
TODAY, July 28, 1995, at 3D.
'25Pacica, 438 U.S. at 750-51.
126 See Norman Martin, Bright Futurefor NA VSystems, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES,
June 1, 1998, at 75 (discussing the future production of cars with Internet access).
127 See Daimler-Benz, Internet on Wheels (visited Nov. 23, 1998) <http://www.
daimler-benz.com/indgfnav-e.html?/researh/text/70430_e.htm>.
121 See Intel Corp., Intel Connected Car PC Technology Demonstrated at World's
Largest Automotive Show (visited Nov. 23, 1998) <http://www.intel.com/pressroomI/
archive/releases/1C090997.HTM>; see also Intel Corp., Connected Car PC (visited Nov. 23,
1998) <http://www.intel.com/ pressroom/initiatives/carpc.htm>.
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activated computer than runs Windows CE. The respective devices, which
have an audio format, are capable of playing Net radio. Another
company, Clarion, is also rapidly developing a similar kind of
technology. 129
What this means, if current First Amendment law holds, is that
George Carlin's "indecent" skit may legally be heard in cyberspace
anywhere, anytime, by anyone, and on Net radio in Web cars or in
conventional cars equipped with audio PCs.130 Conversely, Carlin-type
programs cannot air on broadcast radio of the kind heard in cars with
standard factory radios. Thus, the medium still defines the measure of
liberty for First Amendment purposes. But technology has undermined
whatever logic this dual rule of law may have ever enjoyed. More
importantly, it has placed that illogic in bold relief.
While the Court, lawmakers, jurists, and legal commentators have
yet to realize the consequences of convergence, 1 31 the fact is that those
real-world consequences are already being played out, and will be played
out more, in the realm of radio and beyond.1 32 Of course, technology's
ability to integrate one medium into another does not end with radio and
the Internet. The same kind of technological advances that made Net radio
real will in time make Net TV, Interactive TV, and Interet-ready TV far
more commonplace than they are today. 133 The operative idea is to
reinvent the medium, to make it technologically and operationally
129 See Cathryn Baskin, Windows & Bugs Everywhere, PC WORLD, Mar. 1998, at
19.
130 See Julia Angwin & Jamie Beckett, Network PCs to Star at Comdex, SUN
SENTInEL, Nov. 15, 1997, at 15C (describing Interet-enabled cars from IBM and Intel allowing
consumers to listen to Net radio in their cars); Kevin Jost, The Car as a Mobile Media Platform,
AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERING, May 1, 1998, at 49.
131 See David Bank & Dean Takahashi, Microsoft Plans Big Digital-TV Push,
Stressing Hardware Programming, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1997, at B2; Owen D. Kurtin,
Everything that Communicates Must Converge-The Merging of Technology and Services and
the Growth of the 'Net Raise Thorny Legal Issues, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 20, 1998, at B 12.
132 See Denise Caruso, The Puzzle of Making the Internet Into a Broadcast
Medium, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1997, at D4; Mark Gauvreau, RealAudio Has Cyberheads Hip-
Hoppin ', INsiGHT, Feb. 17, 1997 (discussing a convergence of TV, radio and computers into one
interactive environment).
133 See Eric Brown, Interactive TV: The Sequel, NEW MEDIA, Feb. 10, 1998, at
36-41.
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diverse. 134
If one begins with the supposition that the Communications Act
of 1934135 does not formally authorize regulation of today's Internet and
similar cyber-domains, then that body of law so long applicable to
television may prove non-binding on Internet-TV providers. Absent a new
body of communications law and a regulatory agency such as the "Internet
Commerce Commission,"'136 the post-Reno Internet will not be regulated
anywhere near the way its broadcast counterparts have been. 137 If (and
when?) such regulation were to occur, it would necessitate constitutional
consideration of the very points occasioned by the new communications
technology. 1
38
New digital and post-digital communications media invite
reconsideration of some of the basic concepts of the broadcast regulatory
scheme. Consider, for example, just how much First Amendment doctrine
is bound up with the fact of' spectrum scarcity and the licensing and
regulatory rules that flow from that fact. Questions of state action,
government speech, monopoly, diversity, public access, and fairness
generally have all depended on the traditional character and operation of
broadcast communication. 139 But what happens when a new medium,
such as the Internet or its successors, offers up radio and television of a
different character? That is, what happens when the very notion of
134 See Frank Rose, The Televisionspace Race, WIRED, Apr. 1998, at 148-5 1.
13547 U.S.C. § 309.
136 See Newsbytes, Hatch Warns of Govt. Commission ifMicrosoft Takes Over
Internet, (visited Feb. 5, 1998) <http://www.sprynet.com/newsbytes/headl .html> (Senator Orrin
Hatch (R. Utah) referring to the possibility of a "new Internet Commerce Commission").
137 This is not to suggest that anything will be sanctioned in cyberspace, be it
consumer fraud, libel, copyright violations, or criminal threats. See, e.g., Martin Schwimmer &
Craig S. Mende, Madonna and Audio Streaming; Copyright Infringement on the Internet,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 9, 1998, at 53; see generally Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U.
Chic. L. Rev. 1199. But see Reid Kanaley, Lawless in Cyberspace?, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov.
20, 1997, at F1 ("David Post doesn't believe the Internet can be bound by traditional rules.")
138 See Robert Kline, Freedom of Speech on the Electronic Village Green,
Applying the First Amendment Lessons of Cable TV to the Internet, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 23 (1996); Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for
Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 1687 (1996).
131 See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 5-174 (1994).
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spectrum scarcity is redefined in or even obliterated by cyberspace? The
point, of course, is not that cyberspace will rid the world of all
communications injustices. Hardly. There will be new injustices, to be
sure. For that reason alone, the law of the future needs to be linked to the
technology of that same future. It simply will not do to saddle the new
media with the law of the old media. Yet, granting that means that the
doctrinal demarcation of media -- i.e., one rule for print, another for radio
and TV, and still another for the Internet -- may no longer be possible, or
at least not possible in ways currently understood. For paradoxically, it is
precisely the different character of the new media that alerts us to the fact
of convergence, to the commingling of media in such a way as to produce
a certain sameness.
140
Essentially, the technological developments of our day require the
Supreme Court to rethink the claim that the First Amendment applies in
different ways to "different" media. To repeat: convergence is the rule
in cyberspace, be it with newspapers, magazines, radio, or even
television. 141 Even before the advent of the Internet, scholars such as
Ithiel de Sola Pool predicted that the convergence principle would affect
principles of communications law.' 42  Years later, Professor Rodney
Smolla made much the same point: "First Amendment doctrines which
are tied to the traditional lines of demarcation among print, broadcast, and
common carrier media lose their vitality as those lines blur, requiring
resort to other principles to determine the constitutionally appropriate level
of regulation.,143
Consistent with de Sola Pool's prescient counsel, the First
Amendment law of the Intemet may one day become the First Amendment
law of all media -- what I label the trace-back principle. The principle
holds that as allowances are made for First Amendment freedoms on the
Internet, such precedents will soon enough trace back (in varying degrees)
140 See GEORGE GILDER, LIFE AFTER TELEVISION (W.W. Norton rev. ed., 1994);
MICHAEL DERTOUZOS, WHAT WILL BE: How THE NEW WORLD OF INFORMATION WILL CHANGE
OUR LIVES (1997); M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 138-171 (1994).
141 See Gilder, supra note 140.
142 See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 1-2, 6-8, 23-42, 53-54,
193,233 (1983); see also IThIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES WITHOUT BOUNDARIES: ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A GLOBAL AGE (1990).
143 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 327 (1992).
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to other forms of media and thus bring about First Amendment parity, or
so it would seem. 144 Otherwise, an intolerable degree of unequal
treatment would manifest itself While it is common knowledge that new
media bring with them new forms of regulation, the converse is seldom
considered, namely: the possibility that new media could actually advance
the culture of free speech regardless of the medium employed.
The nearly unbridled development of American popular and
commercial culture may well have prompted Dr. Meiklejohn to expand the
scope of his views on protected free speech.145 In something of the same
way, the culture of the new technology beckons lawmakers and jurists to
step forward and take a fresh look at our system of freedom of expression
and how it works. It has been done before. For example, prior to 1952
the First Amendment did not apply to motion pictures. The governing
notion was that the cinema was a form of communication entirely different
from that of the constitutionally protected print media. With the passage
of time and the increasing use of audio-visual technology, the Court
ultimately rejected the idea of bifurcated freedom: "[T]he basic principles
of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command,
do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by
this Court, make freedom of expression the rule.', 146 The rhetorical license
of that categorical maxim ought not to trump its truth, namely, iffreedom
of expression is to be the rule, such freedom must not be contingent upon
predicates which can no longer be justified, either technologically or
legally. That is just as true today with radio and television (broadcast or
Net) as it was nearly a half-century ago with motion pictures.
The logic of any such arguments is, of course, inevitably put to the
test of the actual output of any mass medium and how that output is
received by the public. If Net radio (and to a lesser extent, Web TV)
enjoys almost unparalleled libertarian freedom, it is in good measure
because the day is young. A quarter-century ago FM "underground" radio
144 See generally PATRICK M. GARRY, THE NEW MEDIA AND THE FIRST
AMENDMNT 135-70 (1994).
145 See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP.
CT. REV. 245.
146 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
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ventured along similar paths, 147 testing the public toleration. That
libertarian measure of freedom -- exemplified by Jerry Garcia's radio
profanity148 and the ribald banter of "topless radio' '149 -- ultimately bowed
to government intervention of the kind later sanctioned by the Pacifica
Court. 150 A similar fate could await cyber radio and TV, especially when
it comes to communication concerning sex, drugs, violence, and
commercial advertising. Yet if that were to happen -- in the face of
America's conflicted Puritanism and its commercial entertainment
culture 5' -- it would necessitate a reconsideration of what I have referred
to above as the bifurcated First Amendment. For technology makes it ever
more difficult to demarcate the reality of one medium as its intrudes on
that of another. This is not to say that demarcations will not continue to
be made in the future, but rather than the reasons for doing so may have
less to do with the medium employed than with the message conveyed. Of
course, that sort of thinking invites all kinds of First Amendment
problems. But that is another matter for another day.
Radio and television made Alexander Meiklejohn's First
Amendment project ever so much more complicated. Today, there is
cyberspace. New media always redefine doctrinal frontiers. That is the
lesson of history, the lesson of Reno v. ACLU, too.152 But there is an
equally important and overlooked lesson, namely: new media redefine
themselves. The consequences of that postmodern lesson have yet to be
more than partially played out,153 if only because they have yet to be
imagined.
147 See Ronald Collins, Radio Revolution Now Airing In Cyberspace (Jan. 5, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (providing a comparison between yesterday's FM
"underground" and today's Net radio).
14 See WHUY-FM, Eastern Education Radio, Notice of Apparent Liability, 24
F.C.C.2d 408, § 7 (1970).
149 See Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture,
27 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 285 (1973).
150 See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. PowE, JR., REGULATING
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 114 (1994).
151 See generally RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF
DISCOURSE 139-203 (1996).
'52 117 S. Ct. at 2329.
153 Thus, there is the question (raised by the "V chip") of just when government
intervention ceases to be regulation by the state. See Robert Corn-Revere, 'Voluntary' Self-
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MS. STROSSEN: Thank you very much. Our next speaker is Dan Burk,
professor of law at Seton Hall Law School. I think Dan has some slides.
Professor Dan Burk
MR. BURK: I am going to spend the next few minutes talking a little bit
about one of the aspects of the Internet that probably does differ from
what you have heard previously today. I will talk for a few minutes about
the intersection between the jurisdiction and community standards in the
obscenity test, with which you may be familiar. In particular, how does
this intersection play out on the network and what does it mean for the
future of the enforcement of obscenity laws on the Internet?
Unlike the area of civil procedure and personal jurisdiction, where
there has been a great deal of writing about the difficulties of minimum
contacts with regard to the Internet, 154 there is not a great deal of writing
at this point about criminal procedure and jurisdiction in criminal
proceedings with regard to the Internet. That's because in the United
States, criminal jurisdiction is in a c6mpletely different ballgame. ' We
developed all our complicated rules of personal jurisdiction in civil cases
because in civil cases we allow default judgments, where the defendant is
never present. We had to decide when it would be fair to do that. In the
United States, however, personal jurisdiction in a criminal prosecution is
regulation and the Triumph of Euphemism, in RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS:
REGULATING THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA 183-214 (Robert Corn-Revere ed., 1997). An equally
important question concerns the matter of private censorship by powerful media entities, such
as Internet service providers. See, e.g., Andrew L. Shapiro, Freedom from Choice, WIRED, Dec.
1997, at 213; Andrew L. Shapiro, The Danger of Private Cybercops, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4,
1997; Nadine Strossen, Filtering Out the Truth, (visited Jan. 1, 1998) <http://
www.intelectualcapital.com/com/ issues/98/0101/icopinionsl .asp>.
154 See, e.g, Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1095
(1996); Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-
First Century, 66 U. CrnN. L. REv. 385 (1998).
155 See Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders, 1 VA. J.L. &
TECH., 21,23 (1997) <http://scs.student.Virginia.EDU/-vjolt/graphics/voll / homeart3.html>.
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always based upon the actual presence of the defendant in the legal
forum. 156 We have in the United States Constitution a Confrontation
Clause, which requires that the defendant be allowed to confront the
witnesses against him. That means that he has to show up at least once in
order to be prosecuted. If he shows up and then skips town we can
prosecute him in absentia, but we can't prosecute him completely in
absentia.
The Constitution, however, also provides for full faith and credit
between the states,1 57 and for an Extradition Clause158 which is
implemented through an Interstate Compact and Uniform Extradition
laws' 59 This means that as long as you have a valid warrant for arrest of
the defendant, he will be extradited and brought to the forum, assuming
he can be found. The other states must give full faith and credit to a
facially valid warrant. So unlike civil procedure, at least within the United
States, personal jurisdiction is almost never a problem in a criminal
proceedings. You simply have to make sure the defendant is physically
present, and the Constitution provides the means to do that.
What this means is that in criminal proceedings we focus on
questions of venue. Under the common law, venue is proper wherever a
material element of the crime is either initiated or completed. 160 Or, in
some cases, where the crime is in progress, as for example, in a continuing
crime such as kidnapping. If you drag the kidnapping victim through
some jurisdiction, that is a continuing crime and venue is proper there, as
the kidnapping is in progress. So venue lies where the crime has begun or
is completed, or sometimes where it is continuing, and the statutes on
obscenity take this into account. For example, federal statutes, which
prohibit sending obscenity through the mails, or sending obscenity in
interstate commerce, for example, make venue proper wherever the
obscene material is sent, wherever it is received or, or in some cases in the
156 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRMINAL LAW § 2.9(d) (2d
ed. 1986).
157 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
158 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
159 See UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT, 11 U.L.A. § 6 (1974).
160 See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 156, at § 16.1 (d).
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places that it passes through. 6 '
Now, that brings us to the second part of our inquiry, the Miller
standard. 162 The United States Supreme Court has defined obscenity for
us, obscenity being a type of speech that is unprotected by the First
Amendment. So unlike most other types of speech, people can be
penalized for producing or possessing obscenity. The Supreme Court told
us in Miller that obscenity appeals to the prurient interest; does not have
a serious, literary, artistic scientific value; and offends local community
standards. That local standard question raises some pretty serious
problems when we start to talk about the Internet because, as has been
mentioned here this morning, the technical structure of the Internet does
not take into account geographic boundaries or political boundaries. 1
63
Consequently, the network extends to all sorts of communities and creates
a connection between communities that may have different kinds of
standards; that is, communities that might define obscenity differently
under Miller.
The intersection of venue and local standards worked fine when
we were dealing with the old world, the world of atoms, but it may not
work well in the world of bits. In the past, venue was proper where the
obscene material was sent from or where it was received, and you would
apply the standards of one of those two local communities to determine
whether the material was obscene or not. In fact, there were a series of
appellate decisions that say those are the only places where you can apply
the local standards: the places where venue was proper. 1
64
As a practical matter, then, in obscenity prosecutions, the state or
federal government, whoever initiated the prosecution, got to essentially
choose which of the eligible venues they liked best. The government
could initiate the prosecution in the venue with the set of community
standards most favorable to a conviction. 165 They could even arrange to
161 See 18 U.S.C. § 3227(a).
162 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
163 See generally Burk, supra note 155.
164 See, e.g., United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1047 (1983); United States v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Sandy, 605 F.2d 210 (6th Cir), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979)
165 See Sandy, 605 F.2d at 217.
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pose as purchasers of the material in such a way as to have the venue they
wanted. So it has been common to see the practice, particularly in the case
of the federal prosecution, of the government choosing a very
conservative, restrictive local community, and arranging to receive the
obscene materials there, so that particular local community standard would
be applied.
Now, what happens when these standards of venue and obscenity
begin to be applied to activity on the Internet? We get cases like the
United States v. Thomas, 166 in which sexually explicit materials were
downloaded from a computer bulletin board in California to the
conservative community of Memphis Tennessee. Thomas is not a pristine
Internet case, first because it dealt with a dial-up computer system, and
second because the facts are muddied by prosecution under a postal mail
charge. An obscene videotape was sent by the defendants to Tennessee
in the postal mail, but materials were also downloaded by federal agents
in Memphis, Tennessee, who then initiated prosecution against the owners
of the computer bulletin board system in California from which the
material was taken.
With regard to the download, the defendants in Thomas claimed
there that they were physically located in California and local community
standards there dictated that the material on their computer was not
obscene. The local California prosecutor had investigated the owners of
the system and decided not to prosecute them because he concluded he
could not win a conviction because the material would not be considered
obscene in California. But it was very clearly considered to be obscene in
Memphis, Tennessee, where it was received, because under the local
community standards there, the material was found to be objectionable
under Miller.
Now, we will have similar situations on the Internet, without the
tape in the postal mail, and without any way for the purveyor of the sexual
materials to know where the material is being downloaded. If the
communities on each end of the transmission have different community
standards, when we essentially have these two competing standards that
could govern the obscenity determination, we have to ask which one of
166 United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
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them will be applied. As a practical matter, as we said, the government in
bringing the prosecution decides which standard ought to be applied. This
causes difficulties, especially when we think about what the Supreme
Court decided in Miller. The Supreme Court said we don't want big, evil,
liberal, urban jurisdictions to dictate to smaller conservative jurisdictions
what the standard for obscenity ought to be. So we will look to the local
standards so that the big jurisdictions cannot dictate to the smaller
jurisdictions what the standard for obscenity should be.
In other words, Miller is based on the principle that we don't want
places like Memphis to be overpowered by places like New York. But
these places are now connected on the Internet, so people are worried
about the race to the bottom -- or perhaps it is a race to the top, but
certainly it is a race to the most restrictive standard. So rather than New
York dictating to Memphis what the standard on obscenity should be,
under Miller Memphis may now be dictating to New York, San Francisco
or wherever what the standard ought to be. So I can place material out on
the Internet, you can pull that up from wherever you happen to be. I
frequently don't know where you are located. I usually can't find out
where you are located unless I somehow go outside of the network,
perhaps by mail, to ask you who you are. I am sort of at the mercy of
whoever decides to access my material on the net.
Some people have said, well, we can fix that by having a national
standard. This would be going back to Roth, prior to Miller, where the
Supreme Court articulated a national standard. Perhaps we should just
recognize that we are all interconnected now, that we can't keep local
communities separate, and so we should have a national standard. The
problem, of course, is that we then lose the diversity of communities, what
the Supreme Court was trying to preserve in Miller. We would lose the
diversity of having jurisdictions with different standards.
Other people have suggested maybe the community standard
ought to be the standard of the community that uses the Internet. They
say, let's not look at geographic communities, let's look at the Net
community. The problem there, of course, is there is no Internet
community. There are all kinds of people using the Internet. It is difficult
to single out what the Internet standard would be, at least as difficult as
figuring out a national standard. And clearly, it would have spillover
effects outside the network community. People don't live in cyberspace,
they live in human communities, and the community decides whether they
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find material offensive, that we don't want to have that material around,
such as in the case of people in Memphis who access the Internet.
So, as appropriate for an academic commentator, I will suggest
some ways to deal with the problem, so as to preserve community
diversity from either dominance by liberal or conservative jurisdictions.
One of these suggestions draws on very common principles of law. I call
it "Avenue Unplugged." In most areas of law, we already have standards
for deciding whose laws or standards to use when two jurisdictions with
differing values or standards get into a conflict. We call this conflicts
analysis. What generally happens is the judge in the proceeding uses
principles set out at great length in the case law and so on, to determine
which jurisdiction has the clearest interest here, whose law will we apply.
I can see no reason that we can't do that in the situation I laid out. In the
case of competing community standards, we ask who has the greater
interest here: is it the community in California or is it Memphis,
Tennessee? Once that is done, the judge then instructs the jury, this is the
law you should apply in issuing the decision.
Again, it's hard to see why that can't be done here as in other
conflicts situations. The objection in case law is, well, juries in Memphis
couldn't possibly apply the standards in California, if that's what the judge
feels they should apply, because they are not members of the community
in California. They don't know what the California standards are. But of
course, we ask juries to do things like that all the time. In tort law,
criminal law and elsewhere, we generally inform the jury of the
appropriate standards by expert testimony. We say to them things like, we
want you now to apply the standard that would have applied to a
reasonably prudent physician, even though the jurors aren't physician. Just
like we have experts who will tell you what reasonable doctors would do
to apply the standard, I suggest we might do the same thing here,
introducing expert testimony and other evidence that would tell the jury
what the standard would be in the other jurisdiction, if that's the one that
the judge selects, and then allowing the jury to apply the standards of that
community much as they do in tort law and other areas of criminal law.
My time is running short, so at that suggestion, I will conclude and thank
you for your attention.
MS. STROSSEN: Thank you very much. The final speaker on this panel
is Ann Beeson, a lawyer with the ACLU.
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MS. BEESON:'67 In the last year, we have won no less than five major
victories for free speech in cyberspace. 168 Everybody knows about ACLU
v. Reno. 169 Additionally, in ALA v. Pataki170 we had a judge in New York
strike down a law restricting free speech on Commerce Clause grounds. 
171
Last year, in ACLU v. Miller,72 we had a law struck down that would
have made it a requirement to communicate anonymously over the
Internet. 173  We also won the first free speech victory for encryption
rights 174 out in California, and finally, just last week, we won our fourth
victory against a state law that regulated Internet speech, when a judge in
Alexandria, Virginia, struck down a law that would forbid state
employees, including university professors, from communicating sexually
explicit material on the Internet. 17
5
167 Ann Beeson is a staff attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union's National
Headquarters in New York City where she works as a litigator and online activist to promote and
protect civil liberties in cyberspace. Ms. Beeson was counsel for plaintiffs in Reno v. American
Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). She was the primary architect of this landmark
case in which the Supreme Court recently declared the Federal Communications Decency Act
unconstitutional and unequivocally affirmed free speech rights in cyberspace.
168 ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Reno, 929 F. Supp. at
824; Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998); Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 160;
Bernstein v. Department of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Ca. 1997).
169 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
170 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
17' Id. at 183-84 (finding the New York criminal statute unconstitutional on
Commerce Clause grounds, since "[t]he nature of the Internet makes it [im]possible to restrict
the effects of the New York Act to conduct occurring within New York.").
172 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
Id. at 1233-34 (declaring the Georgia law prohibiting the use of aliases on the
Internet unconstitutional prior restraint, inasmuch as encryption software was singled out and
treated differently from other software).
174 Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1310 (stating that the Federal law regulating
encryption was an unconstitutional prior restraint, inasmuch as encryption software was singled
out and treated differently from other software).
175 Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 634.
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I was actually looking forward to a little break this year and
thought that we wouldn't have as much work to do. Because we had won
several victories, we thought that lawmakers would slow down their
attempts to squelch free speech on the Internet. Unfortunately, I was
wrong. We have seen absolutely no end to the creativity from lawmakers
in proposing and passing new laws to regulate speech on the Intemet at all
levels: federal, state and local.
I want to talk about some of these new threats. The first
generation of battles against government regulation, which we won
primarily in the last year, was about saving the Internet as a medium from
total destruction. These laws were primarily criminal laws that banned
huge categories of speech from the Internet. 76  Unfortunately, those
battles are continuing because some lawmakers are literally drafting laws,
word for word, that we previously got struck down, and are passing them
again. We are also seeing what I call the second generation of Internet
free speech battles which have to do more with ensuring and protecting the
quality of the Internet as a true marketplace of ideas. InACLUv. Reno,
177
the Supreme Court went out of its way to applaud the Internet as the most
participatory mass medium the world has yet seen.178 They discussed the
content of the Internet as being as diverse as human thought.1
79
The second generation of battles is going to be about whether we
can keep that thought on the Internet. It will be about who gets to speak
on the medium, who gets full access.180 I think at risk here are the same
folks who were at risk in the first generation battles. First, minors. I can't
say this enough: Minors have made unbelievable contributions to this
medium and have been incredibly creative in the content they themselves
17 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (1998) (criminal statute concerned with fraud
and fraudulent practices on computer systems); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.21(3)
(McKinney 1998).
177 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
17 Id. at 2340.
1"9 Id. at 2335.
'so See generally American Civil Liberties Union, Letter To Senate Commerce
Committee on Internet Indecency (visited Oct. 29, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/
go21098b.html> (discussing the new attacks on free speech involving attempts to regulate
access ofInternet users).
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have created and posted on the Intemet;181 they understand more than any
of us the value of communicating with people around the world using this
new technology. Their ability to maintain content and participate fully in
the medium is going to be crucial as to whether or not in the next century
the Internet becomes the medium of choice for communication. We
should continue to protect their free speech rights as well. Second,
marginalizing controversial speakers on issues from transgenderism to
safer sex to sexual abuse. 182 Third, low income people and people of
color who are still vastly underrepresented on the medium and will be
even more so if we continue to pass restrictive laws. 1
83
Now to get to the press. First of all, the federal legislators were
not as scared as they should have been by the Supreme Court decision in
ACLUv. Reno.184 We have had two very serious attempts to restrict free
speech this year. The first was by Senator Coates, and is pretty much a
copy of the CDA with all of the same problems. He tried to narrow that
legislation by applying it only to commercial distributors on the Web.' 85
Unfortunately, the drafting was just as poor as the drafting on the CDA in
181 See generally Kathleen Parrish, Web Debate: Threat or Self-Expression?; New
Age Form of Bathroom Graffiti Has DAS Disagreeing on What to do About Student's
Derogatory Remarks About Teachers, MORNING CALL, Sept. 20, 1998, at BI (discussing
student's creativity in moving their graffiti regarding teachers from bathroom walls to the
Internet).
182 See Brief of Appellees at 5, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 96-
511), available in <http://www.aclu.org/court/renovaclu.html> (referring to web sites which
provide information regarding safer sex, prisoner rape, and gay and lesbian issues).
183 See Allen S. Hammond, The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996: Codifying the
Digital Divide, 50 FED'. Comm. L.J. 179, 196 (1997) (discussing the high cost in procuring
computers and gaining access to such devices and the fact that such costs continue to preclude
penetration into this medium among the poor); see also Haran Craig Rashes, The Impact of
Telecommunication Competition and the TelecommunicationsAct of1996 on Internet Service
Providers, 16 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 49 (1997) (restating the effect of initial costs on the
ability of the poor to make use of the Internet).
184 See The Glory of Offensive Speech, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 11, 1998,
at B2 (stating that "[t]he bill is a gussied up evil twin of its predecessor, the Communications
Decency Act .... The new law suffers the same pitfalls as the old one."); S. 1482, 105 th Cong.
(1998).
"5 S. 12144-01 and S. 12149, 105 th Cong. (1997) (Senator Coates stating: "The
legislation I introduce today is strictly limited to the commercial distribution of pornography on
the World Wide Web.").
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that it mandated that adults communicate only what is fit for children.' 6
Additionally, Senator McCain has proposed a bill which would prevent
any public school or library that gets funding for Internet access from
getting that access unless they install blocking software on all of their
computers. 187 I have very serious problems with that which I will talk
about later.
A second problem area is state regulation. We have been
monitoring state bills and have successfully challenged three of them
already over the last three years. 188 There have been over 25 states that
have already proposed and sometimes passed these laws.18 9 So far this
year we have, and this is very early in the legislative season for most states,
five new laws that have been proposed: Illinois, 190 Rhode Island, 191 New
Mexico,' 92 Kansas '93and Tennessee. 194 The New Mexico law has already
been passed and is expected to be signed into law in the next week.195
Interestingly, it is word for word identical to the statute that was struck
down in ALA v. Pataki'96 here in New York last year. 197 If I were a
taxpayer in New Mexico I would be outraged by this, as I think all
taxpayers should be, because they continue to have to pay the expenses
generated by these clearly unconstitutional proposals. Tennessee
legislators have proposed a law that has several distinct provisions. 198 It's
"" S. 12149, 105 t" Cong. (1997).
1
87 See S. 1619, 105 th Cong. (1998).
"' See Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1228; see also Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 634; ACLU
v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D.N.M. 1998).
189 See American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Cyber-Liberties: Online
Censorship in the States (visited Oct. 29, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/censor/
stbills.html> (listing pending and existing state bills regulating Internet censorship).
190 H.R. 2568, 9001 Gen. Assembly, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997).
191 S. 2864, 1997-98 Gen. Assembly, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1998).
192 S. 127, 43rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 1998).
19' S. 670, 77d' Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1998).
194 H.R. 3353, 100 th Gen. Assembly (Tenn. 1997).
195 See Parrish, supra note 181, at B 1.
196 969 F. Supp. at 183-84 (holding N.Y. Penal Law §235.21(3) to be in violation
of the Commerce Clause).
197 id.
198 H.R. 3353, 100th Gen. Assembly (Tenn. 1997) (holding Internet service
providers strictly liable for distributing "obscene material, child pornography, or pornographic
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a sort of thumb your nose at the ACLU law by including basically
everything we have come out against. It requires mandatory filtering in
libraries and schools, 199 it imposes criminal liability for communicating
harmful content to minors, 200 it holds Interet service providers strictly
liable for child pornography,20 1 and I am sure I am leaving other points
out. The Tennessee bill includes everything but the kitchen sink .202
Actually, I think it is appropriate, because we are talking about
state laws, and because I mentioned the New Mexico law which is like one
struck down in New York, to respond a bit to Jeanine Pirro's comments
about the Pataki case. I am kind of amazed, actually, at Jeanine's spiel
about the law, and here is why. The attorney general seemed to ignore the
fact that the law passed in New York had two provisions. The first
provision was the one we challenged, which made it a crime to
communicate any harmful content in cyberspace. 20 3 The second one made
it a crime to communicate harmful content to a minor for the purpose of
soliciting sexual conduct with a minor.20 4 We did not challenge that
second provision, and it is still on the books.20 5 I would think she would
be thrilled that she can use it to prosecute people like she described, the
materials harmful to youth" and mandating the use of blocking software on terminals in public
schools and libraries).
199Id. at §§ 3(a), 4(a).
'0Id. at §§ 3(b), 4(b).
20 Id. at § 6.
202 H.R. 3353, 100d' Gen. Assembly (Tenn. 1997).
203 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(3) (McKinney 1998) (stating that "[a] person
is guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree when, knowing the
character and content of the communication ... he intentionally uses any computer ... to...
engage in such communication... and by means of such communication he importunes ... a
minor to engage in ... sexual conduct. . ").
204 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22(2) (McKinney 1998) (stating that "[a] person is
guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree when by means of such
communication he importunes, invites or induces a minor to engage in sexual intercourse,
deviate sexual intercourse, or sexual contact with him, or to engage in a sexual performance,
obscene sexual performance, or sexual conduct for his benefit. Disseminating indecent material
to minors in the first degree is a class D felony.").
205 William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary to Penal Law § 235.22, WEST
ELECTRONIC UPDATE (1998) (stating that "[t]he statute defining the crime of disseminating
indecent material to minors in the first degree [§ 235.22] was not a subject of the action for an
injunction, and its enforcement is thus not enjoined.").
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fellow whose name she did not mention, Barstow, who came out to New
York. As I said, that law is still on the books and there are several other
states that have similar laws that rightly criminalize the solicitation of
sexual acts with a minor.20 6
Local regulation is the next major problem that we have been
seeing. County and city boards are passing policies that require public
libraries to install filtering software on all of their computers.20 7 We have
successfully settled one case out in Bakersfield, California.20 8
They were blocking an unbelievable number of valuable sites on
the Internet, and when we threatened to sue, they backed down. The
policy now in place involves leaving the filtering software on only one
computer in every library and leaving it up to the patron to decide whether
to turn that software on; the default is that it is off.
We have also just intervened in the last couple of weeks in the first
challenge to mandatory filtering software in a library in Loudoun County,
Virginia.20 9 Last Friday we had the first hearing in that case and we were
very fortunate to poll the same judge who just issued our victorious ruling
in Hamilton, who by the way was a librarian before she became a judge,
so we tend to love librarians.
I want to give you a sense of the kind of speech that is blocked by
this type of software because a lot of people, obviously the defenders of
these policies, defend them by saying the blocking software blocks access
206 Cf. Canadian Argues Idaho Law Violates Right to Free Speech, IDAHO
STATESMAN, June 18, 1998, at 6B (discussing Idaho's law against sexual solicitation of a minor
over the Internet).207 See Emily Tsao, Tualatin Internet Policy Wades Into Murky Waters, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Sept. 28, 1998, at B2 (stating that the city council voted to place filters on all library
computers with Internet access); see generally Ann Beeson, Free Speech in Cyberspace: An
Overview, 482 PRACTICING L. INST, 809, 819-21 (1997). In February 1997, the Mayor of
Boston ordered all Boston public libraries to install an Internet filtering software program on all
computers that access the Internet. Id. Only after the threat of litigation from the ACLU did the
Mayor agree to install the software only on the terminals located in the children's section of the
library. Id.
208 See Leslie Miller, Filters Catch Libraries in Free-Speech Fight, USA TODAY,
Apr. 22, 1998, at 6D (stating that the Kern County public library system in Bakersfield,
California, removed its mandatory filtering software after a warning from the ACLU).
209 See InternetAccess, AuSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Mar. 3, 1998, at A8 (stating that
the ACLU joined the Loudoun County, Virginia lawsuit on behalf of the plaintiffs).
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to pornography and obscenity. In fact, it blocks access to sites that have
absolutely nothing to do with sexual material at all. Some of our plaintiffs
in the Loudoun County case are the American Association of University
Women, whose Web site is blocked by some blocking software, and Rob
Morris, who is a daily columnist for the San Francisco Examiner. I realize
some people think everything that comes out of San Francisco is obscene,
but in fact, his comments were really quite innocuous. Also, the blocking
software blocks access to the Glide Memorial Methodist Church, which
is also in San Francisco. It is particularly unfortunate that they blocked
access to the church's site because Glide is very involved with the poorer
communities in San Francisco. The Church has taken an unbelievable
number of kids who never had a computer at all in their homes and taught
them how to create their own Web sites. They have wonderful sites like
one devoted to Martin Luther King, and there are all sorts of great stories.
Indeed, these kids' Web sites were blocked by the library's filtering
software. Obviously, we are hoping for a successful outcome in that case.
We hope that a victory there will send a message to other county and city
boards around the country who are thinking about requiring mandatory
filtering.
I would like to raise another other point about the blocking
software controversy that I think is crucial. Early on, in the first generation
battles, the rationale of proponents of the censorship laws was almost
always the need to protect minors. Instead of sticking with that somewhat
narrow rationale - and you think it would become even more narrow after
the victories we have obtained in the past year - they have, in fact,
broadened their theory for widening censorship on the Internet, and they
are now totally open to censorship for both adults and kids. Their
rationale for using the blocking software in libraries has become that, if the
software is not used, librarians would be sexually harassed by the
availability of sexual content on the Internet.21 ° So watch this closely.
There are two other trends we are seeing in libraries that are
equally serious. One of them is county boards who are passing policies
210 See Carl Solano, Libraries are the New Battleground for Fights Over Porn on
the Internet, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 24, 1997, at B8 (stating an additional rationale for filtering in
Loudoun County is to protect librarians from sexual harassment through exposure to sexually
explicit materials on the Internet).
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which I would like to call "tap on shoulder" policies. If the librarian sees
something "offensive," or if they think a patron is viewing something
offensive on the Internet, these policies allow the librarian to essentially tap
them on the shoulder and ask them to leave. There isn't a better example
of discretionary censorship policy than that, and we are very worried about
that. Secondly, policies that require all minors, and this includes anyone
under the age of 18, to obtain parental consent before they can access the
Internet at all in the library. We are not talking about sexual material here,
we are talking about a kid who may not be able to get access to
Encyclopedia Britannica online without their parents' consent. Finally, in
terms of local legislation, we are seeing increased efforts by schools to
limit both Web access and communication by use of Web pages. Of
course, the blocking software would be the same in the schools as in the
libraries.
I just briefly want to mention a case that the ACLU was involved
in recently.2 ' It's really an amazing story which has to do with a kid who
had a Web site.21 2 This whole thing started with a call from my mother in
McKinney, Texas, who is quite a conservative Republican. She called me
up and told me about a child of a friend of hers who had a Web site. The
kid is 13 and his name is Aaron, and Aaron had a Web site which he
created totally on his own time, because he loves the Internet, that is what
he lives for, and the Web site was called the CHOW Web site, where
CHOW stood for Chihuahua Haters of the World.213 This site is really a
very clever site along the lines of 100 things to do with one dead cat, only
in this case it was a Chihuahua You know those types, they like big dogs,
not little ones. He had his site up and a somewhat nutty woman out in Fort
Worth found the site, and this woman happens to love Chihuahuas, so she
started to complain to the school because he identified himself as being a
student at McKinney Middle School. She got all of her friends to call and
complain that this was an incredibly offensive site, that he was advocating
211 See generally Tracey Cooper, Boy's Pet Web Page Spoof Comes Back to Bite
Him, ORANGE CouNTY REGISTER, Mar. 7, 1998, at All (explaining that the American Civil
Liberties Union was contacted after a student was removed from computer class for creating a
"Chihuahua Haters of the World" web page).
212 See id.
213See id.
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killing Chihuahuas, et cetera. So, the school calls the kid in. Not
understanding a thing about the Internet, they think he has created the site
at the school, although clearly it was not on the school computer. They
then suspend him for three days and remove him from his emerging
technology classes for the rest of the school year, okay? Really
unbelievable. Fortunately, mom called, the ACLU got involved, and
Aaron is now safely back in his classes at McKinney Middle School.
214
The site is becoming more and more popular, as you can imagine. It is
really clever, I urge you all to find it. With that, I will end my summary of
the continuing harassment of free speech on the Internet. Thanks.
MS. STROSSEN: Thank you. I would now like to give each of our
panelists, in the same order in which they initially spoke, the opportunity
to comment on anything that has been said by any of the others, starting
with Jeanine Pirro.
MS. PIRRO: How much time do we have?
MS. STROSSEN: I have not yet figured that out. I'll let you know when
I have.
MS. PIRRO: All right. First of all, I think it is important to state that the
laws that have been enacted, most of them, and certainly the one in New
York, were enacted with the purpose of protecting children.215 No one
can suggest that protecting children is not a legitimate state interest. We
are talking about intentionally sending pornography to children. In New
York State, the focus of the legislation was not to limit free speech, it was
not to limit the ability of adults to communicate with one another.
As a prosecutor I am not interested in interfering with First
Amendment speech between adults. What I care about is that the Internet
214 See Robyn Blumner, Perspective - Censoring Students in Cyberspace, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1998, at 4D (stating that the American Civil Liberties Union
intervened and Smith was allowed to return to computer class).215 See People v. Barrows, 677 N.Y.S.2d 672,687 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (declaring
that it is the public policy of New York State to protect children from exploitation through sexual
performances).
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gives the pedophile the ability to communicate with a child. In addition,
the Internet allows anonymity. The pedophile can tell the child that he is
13 when in reality he is 51. The child doesn't have the ability to assess the
voice, to assess the face, to make a determination as to whether or not this
is someone who is credible or not credible. The child is a defenseless
victim who is misled into a trusting relationship.
The New York statute was intended to target the individual who
targets the child under the age of 17.216 For all of those people who are
concerned, especially my counterpart here in Westchester County, the
library association, that we were looking to prosecute them, I say, you are
ignoring the intent of the statute. The New York statute, although struck
down, was far more specific and far more defined than the CDA.217 The
New York statute specifically said the material had to be harmful to
minors. 218 The law is very clear in New York on what harmful to minors
means. Harmful to minors means that it appeals to the prurient interest
of,219 that it is patently offensive to prevailing standards220 and that it lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.221 This definition
protects the libraries and the other individuals concerned about artistic
information.
New York State needs a law to adequately punish this criminal
activity. There is no felony on the books to cover this kind of
communication to minors. The only felony on the books in New York
State is 263 of the penal law that may apply to Internet child abuse cases,
216 See generally Matthew Gunn, American Civil Liberties Union v. Pataki, 8
DEPAtJL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 211,224 (1997) (stating that New York Penal Law § 235.32(3)
criminalizes knowingly communicating with a minor, via a computer, information which, in
whole or in part, depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse,
and those materials which are harmful to minors).
217 See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(d) (1996). The Communications Decency Act, or Title
V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, prohibited both the knowing transmission of obscene
or indecent messages to any recipient under eighteen years of age and the knowing transmission
or posting of patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person under eighteen
years of age. Id.
2Ms See Gunn, supra note 216, at 221 (stating that New York Penal Law §
235.21(3) criminalizes knowingly communicating obscene material with a minor).
219 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235(6) (McKinney 1997).
220 See id.
221 See id.
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makes it a felony to use a child in a sexual performance.222 This statute
applies only to child pornography.223  However, when one is
communicating via the Internet, the pedophile may or may not be using a
child in a sexual performance. There is a gap in New York. I don't think
that anyone on this panel, including the last speaker, Ann Beeson, would
think that it is okay for a pedophile to go into a park and appear before
kids engaging in sexually explicit communications, much less passing out
pictures of children engaged in sexual activity. If anybody here thinks
that's okay, then I am in the wrong room. The bottom line is that the same
application should apply to the Internet. Thank you.
MS. STROSSEN: Jacob Lewis?
MR. LEWIS: Well, I should say that I am not on the criminal side of
Justice. I am a civil litigator, and we tend to defend the statutes and get
pounded on various points. Maybe it is the profession or the particulars
of my job, but I tend to be a little more skeptical with most hard-line
statements to be made either way on the Internet. It does seem to me that
the reason Ann is confronted with legislative proposals even this year as
opposed to last year is that there is still a great concern with legislators and
presumably some, if not all, of their constituents, that there remains a
serious problem out there on the Internet. The CDA was obviously held
unconstitutional, 4 but there ought to be some more creative way of
ordering things so that parents' ability to protect their children from this
type of material (and believe it or not, there really is some hair-curling
stuff out there on the Internet) is accounted for. Ifthere is some way to
protect children while at the same time not blowing up free speech rights
on the Net, then it ought to be explored. So I don't think that it is
surprising there is a second generation of legislative proposals out there,
and I don't think the creativity of the software providers, legislators,
222 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(1) (McKinney 1997). The Penal Law defines
"sexual performance" as any performance that includes sexual conduct by a child less than
sixteen years of age. Id.223 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00 (McKinney 1997).
224 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2332 (finding that "the CDA lacks the precision that the
First Amendment requires when a statue regulates the content of speech").
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libraries, other interested parties that use the Net to address these problems
has been fully explored.
You know, it is interesting to me that in the Reno case the CDA
was attacked because it was sort of a blunderbuss approach that did not
take into account more narrowly tailored mechanisms like filtering and
blocking software. Now it is time for filtering and blocking software, and
lo and behold, it turns out the filtering and blocking software (which, after
all, the government pointed out in the Reno case, had their own problems)
itself presents its own problems with regard to the First Amendment.
Speaking just personally, it seems to me that one of the difficulties in the
way the Reno litigation arose is that Congress put the CDA litigation on
such a fast track that you had a Supreme Court decision almost at the first
step rather than the last step in the litigation. Ordinarily, when you have
a Supreme Court decision on this type of issue, with regard to cinematic
performances and the First Amendment, for example, it comes after a long
series of lower court decisions. That process has sort of been reversed
here, so I don't know that every solution has been tried in this area.
I also think that the idea that any regulation of the Internet would
impermissibly burden adult speech on the Net ignores the fact that there
is certain material out there that no one would want children to get. Look,
I have a five-year-old son. If I allowed him on the Net right now, he
would be able to surf quickly through stuff, and God knows what he
would come up with. It is quite possible he wouldn't understand a lot of
that stuff, but graphic images are a different matter -- in the Pacifica case,
one of the concerns was that the material involved would have an impact
on children too young to read because it was audio.225 It's the same thing
with regard to the graphic images on the Net.
Anyway, I guess the long and the short of it is that there continues
to be a problem out there. It is not surprising to me there will continue to
be legislative efforts to see what can be done with the problems. That
dialogue is by no means finished. I am not sure that the five victories are
going to end anything this year. Of course, you should feel proud, Ann,
that you had five victories. You may have to have a few more, or a few
... See id. at 749 (finding that because "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children, even those too young to read... Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's
vocabulary in an instant").
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losses, perhaps, before the dialogue is entirely over.
MS. STROSSEN: By the way, we will have time for audience questions.
If any audience member has a question, formulate that and present it at the
microphone after the speakers have a chance to make their comments.
Mr. Freedman?
MR. FREEDMAN: I have no way to compete with my district attorney
in Westchester with regard to the law. I will, however, do my best to
contest a few of the points Ms. Pirro made. First of all, libraries are
supposedly protected for artistic and a host of other reasons. 2 Shortly
before I was hired as Director of the Westchester Library System, one
Westchester Public Library branch was in trouble because it showed The
Godfather as part of a film series and members of its community found the
film offensive. Huckleberry Finn is constantly under attack as well as
Catcher in the Rye. There are even instances in which people object to the
Bible. What may be viewed as artistically acceptable work is open to
challenge by anybody who chooses to challenge it as such. 227 Bertrand
Russell, in New York City, was prevented from teaching a course in
mathematical logic because of his views on morals.228 Anyone can
challenge anything, and I have seen plenty of such challenges as a library
director who is aware of what's going on in libraries around the country.
Someone seeing some kid looking at a page from Planned Parenthood
might say, "This is horrible, I am going to call the police," make a big
brouhaha, call the newspapers and all of the rest. We did not want to be
226 See Minarcini v. Strongsville Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1976)
(stating that "a library is a mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas" that is "specially
dedicated to broad dissemination of ideas" and a "forum for silent speech"); Right to Read
Defense Comm. of Chelsea v. Sch. Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703,715 (D. Mass. 1978)
(stating that "a library is a place [for a student] to test or expand upon ideas").
227 See John M. Curran, Comment, Constitutional Law - Stripping the First
Amendment?, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. Rcv. 237,245 (1992) (stating that "what is considered art by
one person may merely be prurient [sic] conduct to another").
228 Kay v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 18 N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) (stating that
"the appointment of Dr. Russel is an insult to the people of the City of New York and to the
thousands of teachers who were obligated upon their appointment to establish good moral
character and to maintain it in order to keep their positions.").
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exposed to a situation where we could be prosecuted. If the standards and
the perceptions that were presented by Ms. Pirro were written into law, we
would be convicted. But who needs it?
I agree with the point the panelist from the Federal government
raised, that most of what's going on in the Internet is superficial: Many of
the books in libraries are bestsellers, such as fiction, pop psychology, and
self-help books. Some people might categorize these as superficial. My
brother, it seems, spends every night sending jokes to everyone in the
family. I don't know where he finds the time to do this. But he is
communicating with everybody important to him. What is superficial to
one person might be a terrific thing for the people who are both sending
and receiving. I wouldn't knock superficial. Public libraries have always
satisfied tastes for superficial, for deep learning, for research, and
whatever other tastes the library-going public might desire.
The business of regulating, I think, is where the federal
government gets into incredible problems. If we are going to regulate, that
is, not let certain materials be sent over the Internet, and if someone sends
something to me from Helsinki, Finland, it is a private communication; the
information may include some e-mail and some pictures some people
would object to. Is this something the federal government can regulate?
Will private communications between two consenting individuals become
something that the law will attempt to regulate? I don't know. When two
people privately communicate through the mail in this country, no one is
supposed to be opening their letters. 229 But on the Internet, you get these
issues exponentially blown not out of proportion.
A couple more points. I think it is an very idealistic view to think
there is some way of prohibiting communications that might be deemed
offensive, or that kids can actually be protected from offensive images.
We have our beloved President. He is our only President. Right now
fellatio is being talked about on the network news, whether there were
semen stains on his or Monica Lewinsky's clothes. Who would have
believed five years ago, or in the Eisenhower years, that the topic could
have been considered for discussion on Huntley and Brinkley's network
news show?
229 See 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1994) (prohibiting the obstruction of correspondence);
18 U.S.C. § 1703 (1994) (prohibiting the delay or destruction of mail).
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I think it. is extraordinary what kids are being confronted with and
what they have access to in the classroom, on public, network and cable
television, among their friends and the movies. It is unbelievable. I had
to wait until my fifties before I saw some of the stuff that these kids can
see in the movies today. In the 1950s this was unthinkable. We are very
concerned in public libraries about intellectual freedom.230  If we
absolutely eliminate options from people's intellectual pursuits, wherever
their interests take them, the damage can be just terrible. Thank you.
Good night.
MS. STROSSEN: Ron Collins?
MR. COLLINS: I would like to say a few things here about the
Commerce Clause and how it relates to several things we have said today,
including Net Radio. Let me just note at the outset that I think the Pataki
case is one of the most important constitutional cases we have seen in
many decades.23 It certainly belongs in the casebooks, and for those of
you who have not read it, I strongly recommend that you do.
MS. STROSSEN: All of my students do, of course.
MR- COLLINS: Ms. Pirro, one might grant everything you have said; and
one might share your laudable views, as certainly all decent and reasonable
people would. However, as someone who has taught constitutional law
and the Commerce Clause for over a decade, I might grant that and yet
maintain, as a constitutionalist and as a decent human being, that as a
230 See Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Loudoun Library, 2 F.Supp.2d 783,795
(E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that "public libraries are places of freewheeling and independent
inquiry"); see also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (discussing the right to
receive information and ideas in the public school libraries, and holding that such a right is
"inherently corollary to the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly guaranteed by the
constitution.").
231 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 164 (discussing the applicability of the Commerce
Clause to the Internet where "every facet of art, literature, music, news, and debate is
represented"); see generally Robert M. Frieden, Dialingfor Dollars: Should the FCC Regulate
Internet Telephony, 23 RUTGERS COWUTER & TECH. L.J. 47, 50 (1997) (discussing the FCC
policy regarding regulation of Internet radio services as broadcasting).
[VOL. XV
19981 First Amendment Rights in Cyberspace 55
matter of Article 1, Section 8232 Commerce Clause analysis, it is entirel,
of no significance what the intent of the New York lawmakers was in
passing the law. For example, if the State of Illinois passed a law, which
was entirely benign for the purposes of Illinois, about regulating mud
flaps, and its intent was in no way to regulate your state's commerce, I
submit to you that for several decades now the Supreme Court has said the
intent is irrelevant. 233 What is important is the effect. Think about that.
Take Internet radio. What if New York, for entirely laudable
purposes, decided it wanted to regulate broadcast radio and we did not
have a federal law on the books, so only dormant Commerce Clause
analysis governed. I suggest to you it would be outrageous that New York
could somehow dictate the law of the nation so far as the Commerce
Clause goes. This flies in the face of fundamental notions of federalism
that trace back to the 18th century. So far as Internet radio goes,
particularly since the federal government is not regulating that right now,
it is only a matter of time before we start to see the states trying to regulate
in this area.
I wanted to also mention the Oprah case, 234 with which you may
be -- I trust that you are -- familiar. That case involved a state food-
disparagement law, and there the Federal District Court found that the
state statute wasn't violated.235 But right now in 13 states across this
country there are laws that make it either a civil or criminal wrong to
criticize certain foods.236 What that means is that if anybody criticizes or
disparages food products in any of those 13 states on the Internet, such
folks may well find themselves subject to liability, and this is after the
Oprah ruling.237 Right now, as we speak, a public interest group is being
232 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
233 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
234 Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
235 Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 864 (explaining how the plaintiffs failed to prove
each element required by the statute).
236 
See, e.g., Debora K. Kristensen, What Can You Say about an Idaho Potato?,
41 ADvoc. 18, 21 (1998) (stating that so-called veggie libel laws are troubling because they
attempt to abridge the open discussion of food quality).237 Mr. Collins co-authored an Amicus Brief presented to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey (no. 98-10391) (Dec. 31, 1998). The
Amicus brief was submitted on behalf of the Center for Science in the Public Interest, Society
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS.
sued for $75,000 for disparaging eggs.238 If I were to do that on the
Internet, or send out a newsletter as the Center for Science in the Public
Interest does or as other public interest groups do, we might find ourselves
being sued in Ohio, Mississippi, Alabama, or any of the 13 states that have
these statutes.
MR. FREEDMAN: I put in cheap vacations and I got ten different porn
sites. Web cars could do that, too, for example.
MR. COLLINS: In the Web cars, I should say, the video portion is on the
back of the headrests and in the passenger seat, on the passenger side. The
driver only gets audio. Now, whether or not that constitutes abridgement
of speech, I don't know. Thank you.
MR. BURK: Two quick points during the time that I have. I think, first,
with regard to the type of statutes that Ann Beeson talked about and as to
the intent of the statutes, as Ms. Pirro talked about, I think we would all
agree the intent of the statutes is certainly admirable and we would all
agree that it would be delightful to have such statutes, and we would all
welcome statutes that reflect that intent. The problem we have had
repeatedly in this area is that the statutes are so incredibly poorly drafted
that the intent, as Mr. Collins said, really doesn't matter much. When the
CDA was first passed, there were law professor types such as myself who
looked at the text on the Internet and we said, "Wow, this is fabulous. If
we had sat down and purposely set out to write a statute that completely
violated the First Amendment and will undoubtedly be struck down by the
Supreme Court, we could not ourselves have come up with better
language to accomplish that purpose."
of Professional Journalists, Association of American Publishers, and the American Booksellers
Foundation for Free Expression.
238 See Ken Silverstein, Veggie Libel, Wilted Press: How Food-Disparagement
Laws Gag Reporting on Issues of Public Health and Safety, NATION, Apr. 20, 1998, at 23
(showing that the Public Interest Research Group is being sued by Buckeye Egg Farm for
disparaging the company's practice on packaging and selling eggs); see also Margaret A. Jacobs,
Public-Interest Groups Want Law on Product Defamation Killed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1998,
at B5. The action has since been dropped by the plaintiff. See Richard Willing, Egg Farm
Drops "Veggie Libel" Suit, USA TODAY, July 7, 1998, at A5.
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The same could be said for most of the other Internet statutes Ann
mentioned. You have half a century of Supreme Court precedent telling
us what is acceptable and what is not. I think we would all welcome
well-drafted statutes to implement Ms. Pirro's intent if they would follow
the precedent that is actually out there.
The second point. Changing hats to the hat I wear as an
intellectual property scholar: much of what I do with the First
Amendment really is the flip side of intellectual property, and this goes
back to the point which was made about Internet radio. As I heard the
description of Rip-Off Radio, I thought that was wonderful, delightful, but
all of the alarms and whistles and bells from my intellectual property
training went off. I said to myself, these guys are clearly involved in
unauthorized reproduction and distribution and public performance of
copyrighted works. This suggests that the CDA and other statutes we
discussed here today, as horrendous as they are, as frightening as they are
to free speech and civil liberties, will pale in comparison to the true threat
to speech on the Internet by intellectual property laws. Free speech is now
is at grave risk from copyright bills before the federal legislature.
Congress is looking at bills that essentially will eliminate the public
domain, eliminate fair use, and other types of First Amendment
accommodations in intellectual property.
We are seeing the same thing happen with regard to trademarks.
Going back to the veggie disparagement statutes, it is very closely related
to the types of things that are happening on the Internet, where trademark
law is used to shut down Web sites that are critical toward particular
corporations, and particular trademark holders. Some of you may have
heard of the "K-Mart Sucks" web site, where someone was particularly
unhappy with the K-Mart chain, expressed that sentiment on the Internet,
and found themselves facing a trademark lawsuit. You can say, well, that
is a private action, that's K-Mart, or Texas cattle ranchers, or whoever, not
the state. But remember, of course, that the suit is enabled by
state-created rights to intellectual property, and the tension between the
trademark law, the tension between the copyright law, and First
Amendment, which we have been able to ignore more or less in the
printed world for so long, is going to come to a head, probably very
shortly, with regard to digital media. So we need to keep that in mind as
one of the true threats to our ability to speak freely on the Internet.
58 , N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. [VOL. XV
MS. STROSSEN: Ann Beeson?
MS. BEESON: I have to say I am a little distressed at our district
attorney's knowledge of the New York Penal Code. When I mentioned
the provision which is still on the books, I am not talking about the sexual
performance of a child provision of the penal code. I am talking about the
provision, and I don't know it off the top of my head, although I would
think Jeanine would, that uses the exact same definition she wants to use,
the harmful to minors standard, but which says when you send that type
of material to a minor for the purpose of enticing or soliciting them into
sexual conduct, you have committed a crime. It does not require them to
actually perform the conduct, but it is enticement, and I would think she
would want to use it.
Next, I want to reiterate the point of my colleagues about the
importance of the Commerce Clause ruling,239 I did not have time to focus
on it a lot. We all agree that it is enormously important, we believe it
needs to be replicated, and we are prepared to replicate that decision. If
the governor of New Mexico signs the New Mexico law, we would go and
immediately challenge it on the Commerce Clause grounds and hopefully
get an identical ruling to the one in New York.
Finally, as to whether it is a good thing or bad thing that legislators
continue to pass different codes and laws, I unfortunately am a little less
trusting of the legislators' motives on this issue. I don't think they are
motivated by huge numbers of constituents who call in and complain
about content on the Internet. In fact, I think we all continue to forget
what the actual factual findings of ACLU v. Reno240 were. What the
government failed to do was to establish a compelling interest in
protecting minors from indecent material on the Internet.2 41 They failed
239 See Barrows, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 235.23 "which
prohibits disseminating indecent materials to minors to induce them to engage in sexual
conduct").
240 117 S. Ct. at 2336 (affirming the district court's decision finding that the CDA
was not narrowly tailored to avoid placing an unconstitutionally heavy burden on protect First
Amendment speech).
241 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336 (stating that "[t]he CDA's vagueness undermines
the likelihood that it has been carefully tailored to the Congressional goal of protecting minors
from potentially harmful materials.").
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to establish a compelling interest, and the findings that were relevant to
that included the fact that on the Internet, unlike with radio, the
government's own witness testified that the odds are slim that a minor or
anyone else will encounter sexual content by accident. The court also
found that almost all content on the Internet was clearly labeled with
warnings if it was sexual so that parents and others would be guided away
from it instead of towards it. It is not the case that you turn on the
computer and the stuff gets spit out at you. It just doesn't happen. I think
that that is important to remember. It is also important to remember we
have many existing laws on the books, both at federal and state levels. We
have obscenity laws on the books, we have child pornography laws on the
books and laws on the books that make it a crime to solicit sex with a
minor. All of us are in total agreement, there is no question that those are
good laws and the law enforcement officials should use them vigorously.
My point is, we don't need new laws.
Finally, I think we are getting the question a bit wrong. I am sure
there are parents and others concerned about the content on the Internet.
The question is not whether this is a valid concern, the question is who
gets to decide? Do we want the government making those decisions or do
we want the parents to make those decisions? Whether we are talking
about federal or state legislators or whether we are talking about a
librarian, parents are the ones who should be teaching kids safety on the
Internet. Teaching them not to talk to strangers, just as in life.
MS. STROSSEN: Jeanine?
MS. PIRRO: A couple of things. First of all, the statute, 263, that I
referred to as a felony is the statute which punishes the use of a child in a
sexual performance.242 I believe that is the statute that my colleague from
Westchester County was making reference to. I think what is glossed over
is the fact that the obscenity laws as they are presently written do not apply
242 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1997) (stating that the promotion of a
"sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, [a person]
produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less
than sixteen years of age" as a Class D felony).
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to the scenario that the Barlow case 243 presented in Westchester County.
We must be able to prosecute the person who sends sexually explicit
material to the minor and who intentionally makes contact with that minor
via the Internet. We have a gap in the law and we can't just turn around
and say, well, the First Amendment covers pornography, and therefore,
pedophiles should be free to make contact with minors for the purpose of
communicating indecent material or material that is harmful to minors.
The problem with the CDA was that it was vague. The New York
State statute is very specific, The reason the New York statute failed to
pass muster was not vagueness but that one of the six defenses available
to the person charged with these crimes is that simply making information
available on the Web and making it accessible is an issue. 4 That was not
the intent of the law.245 There is no crime in making protected speech
available over the Internet.246 What we are trying to do is prevent the
criminal from contacting minors for the express purpose of sexually
communicating with and abusing the minor.2 47
I think an important point that is raised but has not been discussed
is the issue of parental rights and duties versus government responsibility.
Who is going to monitor the Internet? Who is charged with protecting our
children? How do we adequately punish those who employ technology to
commit old crimes in new and more devious ways? Given the fact that the
parents are often not as computer savvy as their children, given the fact
243 SeePataki, 969 F. Supp. at 170 (describing a Westchester County case wherein
a pedophile was prosecuted for contacting minors via the Internet and arranging a location to
meet).
244 See, e.g., Stephen Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction In
Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50 FED. CoMM. L. J. 117, 131 (1997)
(describing some of the specific effects of the New York statute).
245 Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames andMeta-Tags: An
Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 243,277 (1998) (stating the New York
statute litigated in Pataki was unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause).
246 See Jefferson, supra note 22, at 70 (reporting Pirro's claim that the intention of
the law was to protect children from pedophiles); see also Heileman, supra note 21, at 122
(quoting Pirro's argument that the statute was needed to prevent pedophiles from electronically
seducing their victims).
147 See Barrows, 677 N.Y.S. 2d at 682 (stating that N.Y. Penal Law § 235.22
expressly incorporated the U.S. Supreme Court's standard for obscenity, which is not protected
by the First Amendment).
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that parents are often out working, we cannot absolve the state of the
obligation to protect its citizenry. The state, in spite of the commerce
clause, still has the right and responsibility to protect the interests of
children.248 The continued safety of children is a legitimate interest of the
state.249
MS. STROSSEN: Any response?
MR. FREEDMAN: Just a quick one. I thank you, Madam District
Attorney, for pointing out that it wasn't the intent of one of the defenses,
but that defense was on the books, and it specifically applied to us and
made us vulnerable.250 I was not going to let that one go and not get
involved in that law because of it. As I indicated in my remarks, had the
libraries been exempt from prosecution for "harmful material" on the
Internet, as it was exempt from prosecution for obscenity in print
materials, then we probably would not have been a party to the lawsuit.
We were vulnerable, however, and it was an incredible concern.
MS. STROSSEN: Any other comments from the panelists? Any
questions from the audience? Don't be shy, now!
MR. FREEDMAN: I can't in any way debate this with District Attorney
Pirro, but I really thought, based on what I heard Attorney General
Vacco's people say, that -- as opposed to what Ms. Pirro is claiming, that
it was only a misdemeanor - the Pataki law was not needed to enable the
prosecution of people feloniously transmitting pornography over the
248 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 183 (rejecting N.Y. Penal Law § 235.22 on
Commerce Clause grounds but affirming that protecting children is a legitimate state objective);
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to "regulate commerce among
the several States .... ).
249 See id; see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982) (stating that the state interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well being
of a minor is a compelling one."); Sable v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
250 See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607; Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
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Intemet.251 I can't be more specific and I am certainly not an attorney, but
that would be something I would pursue with the Attorney General's
office and get clarified.
MS. PIRRO: The felony level relates to a commercial transaction, where
the motive is money or sale, that's where the felony statute applies in New
York State.252 I have it right here in front of me.
MR. FREEDMAN: My concern at that meeting was the Pataki law.
253
The fact is that the Vacco attorneys there were prosecuting people for
sending child pornography and soliciting minors for the purposes of sexual
harm. 5 They said they were prosecuting felony cases on that basis, which
is why I mentioned it. If I either misunderstood or they misspoke, I can't
say.
MR. LEWIS: I have a question. This is really my own personal question,
looking at the background from the nonfederal standpoint, a library
administrator's standpoint, how do you feel about the suits such as the
case the ACLU brought in Loudoun county,255where the library
administration made a decision about a software program they wanted to
implement. Because the library board made the call, I take it the ACLU's
position is that that decision itself violates the First Amendment. My
question to you is how do you feel about those cases?
251 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 162 (referring to Westchester Library System as one
of the parties to the action since "[Ilibraries serve as both access and content providers on the
Internet, providing their patrons with facilities to access the Internet.").
252 See id. at 163 (stating that violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 235 is a "Class E
felony, punishable by one to four years of incarceration").
253 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22 (McKinney 1998).
254 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 183-84 (invalidating the New York statute
criminalizing the use of computer communication system to transfer sexually explicit material
to minors).
255 See Mainstream Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 783; see also American Civil
Liberties Union, Judge Sets Highest Legal Hurdle For Using Blocking Software in Libraries
(visited November 11, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/news/n04OO798a.html> (stating that the
national ACLU and the ACLU of Virginia intervened in a lawsuit on behalf of speakers such as
library patrons in Loudoun County).
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MR. FREEDMAN: How I do feel about the ACLU coming in and telling
me how to run my library?
MR. LEWIS: Exactly. You stated it better.
MR. FREEDMAN: If I am violating the whole tradition of the public
library in this country and what it stands for, I would consider myself liable
to actions by the ACLU.
MR. LEWIS: The American Library Association might come to you and
say, look, this violates 300 years of library practice. I guess that is
somewhat different when somebody says, "And also it violates the First
Amendment." Also, the ACLU has a very nice Web site where they also
describe their victory in Kern County,256 where they said to the Kern
County Library, look, take those filters off or we are going to sue you, and
they did.257
MR. BURK: The point is the libraries can't win. There is another suit
where they are suing the library for not putting the filtering software in the
public access terminals.
MR. LEWIS: Should that be the case, that the library can't win?
MR. FREEDMAN: When we first got involved with the Pataki case, we
got on the news wires and I was called on an interview talk show in LA
and an interview talk show in Rockland County, NY. They were not
interested at all in what I had to say. All they wanted me to do was answer
the question, "How can the public library justify putting pornography on
Internet terminals for children?" They had a very simple perception of the
issue. Certainly, I am not going to begin to justify putting pornography in
256 See American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Hails Victory as California Library
Agrees to Remove Internet Filters from Public Computers (visited November 11, 1998) <http://
www.aclu.org/news/nO 12898d.html>.
257 See American Civil Liberties Union, Kern County Library Filtering Demand
Letter (visited November 11, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/kemcodemand.html>.
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front children. The public library is an institution in most cases supported
by taxpayer funds, public funds. It is responsible, it is liable, it is legally
challengeable, whatever, under the laws of this nation, and the Constitution
applies to the public library as it does to any other institution. The public
library is in the business of making information available on diverse
subjects: be it unpopular, popular, questionable; it is virtually everything
under the sun.
The ultimate point is if the administration of the library, and the
board, which is responsible for public library policy and the use of public
funds, is doing things with that money that violates the Constitution, it, of
course, is subject to action as would be any other public institution or for
that matter any private corporation is subject to action.
It is a strange situation, the ACLU suing the library. The first
thing that the brand new director of the Boston Public Library -- he just
left Colorado Springs, a famous right-wing community, to come into the
Boston Public Library -- encountered pressure to put filtering software on
all of the library PCs. He compromised in that the children's room PC's
would have the filtering software, but the adult PCs would not. It is
complicated, it is political, but ultimately, we are accountable for the
taxpayers' money we spend. If we violate the law, if we violate the
Constitution, we are liable to prosecution, as is anyone else.
MR. COLLINS: Ms. Pirro, I think your point is an honorable one when
you say the state has a legitimate interest in protecting children, and I say
that sincerely. From the vantage point of legal analysis, however, that
doesn't take me very far. The State of Ohio has a legitimate interest in
protecting the agricultural products that form an essential part of its
economy. But the question is not simply one of New York's interest in
protecting kids or Ohio's interest in protecting its agricultural products. If
you take that and use it as your model, are you prepared to say that the 50
states of this union may regulate commerce on the Intemet, commerce that
in one way or another they deem objectionable? For me, that is the
difficult question. I don't know if it is a moral question, but it is a
challenging and important legal question.
MS. PIRRO: I am prepared to say that if an individual targets a minor in
New York for a crime, New York has jurisdiction to prosecute that person
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if the crime occurs in New York. In fact, what we are talking about is
intrastate communications that are harmful to a minor, where someone
within the State of New York makes contact with the minor for the
purpose of disseminating indecent material. What we are not doing is
looking to affect commerce. When Judge Preska made the decision that
this was violating the interstate commerce laws, she used as a linchpin,
that while someone in New York may be contacting someone else in New
York, the communication may go through another state and thus in her
mind violate interstate commerce.
MR. COLLINS: If the state of New York passed a law making it a crime
to use mud flaps of a certain size in New York, and only in New York,
once you are in our jurisdiction, we will enforce the mud flap --
MS. PIRRO: What about guns? Different states have different laws
relating to handguns.
MR. COLLINS: If Congress wants to grant that power to the states, it
may, but unless I am mistaken, Congress does not grant them the
Commerce Clause power.
MS. PIRRO: Is the commerce clause more important than the protection
of children? If states have the right to pass legislation to outlaw possession
of guns in whatever way they consider appropriate, we should certainly
have the right to protect children from intentional harmful conduct.
MS. STROSSEN: You have 30 seconds.
MR. COLLINS: I will just say this, because Ann is waiting in the wings
here.
MS. PIRRO: Your complaint isn't with Ann Beeson and the ACLU. I
didn't say it was.
MR. COLLINS: Take your case to the national government. If the
national government --
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS.
MS. PIRRO: If the national government re-wrote the CDA to reflect the
standards of the New York statute, I venture to suggest the Supreme Court
might well have upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Judge Preska
didn't address any of the other issues, she addressed commerce, holding
that the statute was violative of commerce.258
MR. COLLINS: I will leave it at this, it is mind boggling to think how the
Internet can be an intrastate medium of communication.
MS. PIRRO: If someone contacts another person via the Internet it is
definitely intrastate within that state.
MS. STROSSEN: I will let you have the last word for now, except for
Ann Beeson. Did you have a comment?
MS. BEESON: I wanted to get back to the library issue. I just wanted to
make it clear, and I am sure he [Mr. Freedman] will back me up on this,
I am sure the vast majority of the librarians themselves evaluated the
software and have, like the ACLU, concluded that it is completely
inappropriate for use in a library. Largely, decisions that blocking
software must be installed have been made by political enemies like
county boards and mayors. This issue doesn't have anything to do with a
library in the normal context of what librarians do to make decisions about
what informational resources to make available to patrons. It has nothing
to do with library selection. When blocking software is installed on the
computer in the library, it is not the library that is deciding which sites get
blocked.25 9 In fact, the whole system is set up in a way so the librarian
2
M See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169 (indicating that portions of the New York Act
concerned with interstate commerce contravenes the Commerce Clause for three reasons:
"[f]irst, the Act represents an unconstitutional projection of New York law into conduct that
occurs wholly outside New York[;] [s]econd,. . . the burdens on interstate commerce resulting
from the Act clearly exceed any local benefit derived from it[;] [f]inally, the Internet is one of
those area of commerce that must be marked off as a national preserve to protect users from
inconsistent legislation that, taken to its most extreme, could paralyze development of the
Internet altogether.").
259 Id. (commenting that county library boards have forced libraries to install
blocking programs).
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